Kai-man Kwan
John Mackie thinks that the availability of
naturalistic explanations defeats the argument from religious experience. He draws heavily on William James who seems
to admit that "So far ... as this analysis goes, the experiences are only
psychological phenomena" (quoted by Mackie on p.183). James did want to assert that there is the
Something More & the Beyond. Mackie
comments, "The issue is whether the hypothesis that there objectively is a
something more gives a better explanation of the whole range of phenomena than
can be given without it. James himself
thinks that it does; yet he gives no real argument to support this
opinion. This is, obviously, a less
economical hypothesis than its naturalistic rival" (p.183). This type of naturalistic explanation
objection regards religious experiences as ordinary events to be explained
& does not entertain the possibility that they may have PFEF at all. The further assumptions are that the decisive
criterion here is the Principle of Simplicity & that NEs are simpler than
the theistic explanation.
Mackie's argument can be formulated as
follows:
R1 Ceteris
paribus, among competing explanations, adopt the explanation of an event which
postulates fewer or fewer kinds of entities.
P1 Explanation
of a theistic experience does not invoke any special considerations which
violate the 'ceteris paribus' clause in R1.
C1 Hence,
among the different competing explanations of a theistic experience which are
equally good & adequate, adopt the explanation which postulates fewer or
fewer kinds of entities.
P2 For
each theistic experience, there are competing theistic explanation &
naturalistic explanation which are equally good & adequate.
P3 A
naturalistic explanation always postulates fewer or fewer kinds of entities
than a theistic explanation of a theistic experience.
C2 Hence,
adopt the naturalistic explanation for each theistic experience.
Some comments are in order. R1 is a methodological rule which underlies
Mackie's contention that theism is a
"less economical hypothesis than its naturalistic rival". It is important to spell it out because
simplicity can be measured in different ways and not every way is as
epistemically significant as another. I
indeed agree with Mackie that R1 is acceptable.
Further note that R1 only applies to competing explanations. If two explanations can't be simultaneously true,
then surely they are competing. If two
explanations are each specifying only necessary conditions, then they are not
competing & there is nothing to choose.
So for two explanations to be competing, they at least each specify
causally sufficient conditions for the experience. P1, P2, & P3 are the three premises that
Mackie needs for his argument to go through.
No doubt he thinks P3 is true & essential to his argument. P1 is an unstated assumption. It is needed because R1, in any plausible
version, is only a ceteris paribus rule.
It may be the case that there is something special about theistic
experiences or noetic experiences in general which override the application of
R1 to them. Mackie does not even
consider this possibility & simply assumes P1 to be true. This is essential to his argument. C1 is a corollary from R1 & P1. P2 is the second premise which Mackie needs
to remove all the evidential force of theistic experiences. A theist can grant that many theistic
experiences are open to NEs. But even on
Mackie's principles, this only removes the weight of those & only those theistic experiences
which are thus explainable. As long as
one theistic experience is veridical, it entails the existence of God. So similarly if only for one theistic
experience the theistic explanation is superior to the NE, there is some
evidence for theism.[1]
Since Mackie does not admit that theistic experiences can provide any
evidence for theism, he must hold to P2.
C2, which declares the victory of the NE enterprise, follows from C1, P2
& P3. Since I accept R1, I have to
challenge either one of P1, P2 & P3.
In fact, if my defense of the PCT is successful, then P1 should be
rejected. However, for the sake of the
argument, I would not assume the PCT in the following discussions & suggest
independent considerations which challenge all three premises.
Is Naturalistic Explanation Really Simpler?
I have suggested that R1 only captures one notion of
simplicity. In this section I would
compare theistic and naturalistic accounts of theistic experiences with respect
to different types of simplicity, and then explore the epistemological
implications. Firstly, let me point to
some counterintuitive implications of R1: it would also make phenomenalism
(indeed, the solipsistic type) intrinsically preferable to realism about
external world, and instrumentalism preferable to scientific realism. In general, all non-epistemic explanations
of noetic experience would be simpler according to R1, and hence
preferable. These are not results that
my critics would be prone to accept, e.g. Mackie. It is because it would put the burden of
proof on the realists about the external world and about theoretical
entities. If the battle is not then
irretrievably lost, it would be an immensely harder one for the realists to
fight. Of course, if we are sure that R1
is the only rule relevant here, then the hard battle has to be fought. However, I suggest that many would feel that
such a distribution of burden of proof is not a fair one. If they are not to reject R1, then they can
suggest that there are other rules which override R1 in those cases. This is the line I am adopting here. However, before going on, let me define OI of
a worldview or ontology as the ontological inventory of the entities
considered real in that worldview. For
example, when I write OI(phenomenalism) = {red qualia, green qualia, ... ,
kinaesthetic sensations, auditory sensations, ...}, it means that the
ontological inventory of phenomenalism is the set of qualia, sensations,
etc. So according to R1, one worldview
is simpler than another if the inventory of the former is a proper subset of
the latter. For example, OI(realism
about external world) = {red qualia, green qualia, ... , kinaesthetic
sensations, auditory sensations, ..., tables, rocks, cats, ...} =
OI(phenomenalism) U {tables, rocks, cats, ...}.
Similarly, OI(scientific realism) =OI(instrumentalism) U {protons,
electrons, neutrons, etc.}. (Remember
that what is included in any OI is considered real rather than
fictional.)
Now
let us consider the debate between the phenomenalists and realists. Regardless of the detailed merits or demerits
of each position, I have suggested that R1 should not be the basic rule here
since it imposes an unfair burden of proof on the realists. I think although realists generally grant
R1's applicability to events, they can point out that noetic
experiences are a special kind of events which seem to provide direct
access to reality. So this is the
contention:
R2 R1 is
not applicable to noetic experiences.
This would mean at least that in the case
of noetic experiences, the burden of proof is not on the side of
realists. However, in this thesis, I
have contended that we should take the force of our noetic experiences even
more seriously, i.e., the burden of proof is on the side of sceptics about
noetic experiences. If this is true,
then a third rule is true:
R3 Ceteris
paribus, adopt an explanation of noetic experiences which preserve their PFEF.
Note that R3 and R1 are not contradicting
one another. Since R1 is only a ceteris
paribus rule, we can view R3 as a rule which refines R1 and singles out the
special considerations which go with noetic experiences, a special kind of
events. I have already argued that R3 is
indeed justified. Anyway, it seems to be
the rule which is accepted by many philosophers when they arbitrate the debate
between phenomenalists and realists.
Isn't it very arbitrary not to use it when we come to evaluate another
kind of noetic experience, theistic experience?
At the very least, I contend that R2 is right and hence the assumption
that simplicity of NE in accordance with R1 is the most significant
consideration in this issue is unwarranted.
In other words, P1 is false.
Actually
R3 does not seem to be the only constraint on the application of R1. If this is the case, then the burden of proof
still seems to be on the scientific realists because the existence of theoretical
entities cannot be directly supported by noetic experiences. So if the intuition that it is unfair to put
the burden on the scientific realists is correct, then there should be another
constraint on R1. Let us define the
fundamental inventory, FI, of a worldview as the set of the entity types
considered as fundamental and irreducible in that worldview, symbolised
by FI(worldview). Further define the
function n[FI(worldview)] as the number of entries in that FI. We can then construct another notion of
simplicity:
Worldview1 is simpler than worldview2 iff n[FI(worldview1)] is smaller than n[FI(worldview2)].
To distinguish the earlier notion of
simplicity from this one, they are called 'OI-simplicity' and 'FI-simplicity'
respectively. My suggestion is that
considerations of FI-simplicity are at least as important, if not more
important, than considerations of OI-simplicity especially when we evaluate
worldviews. This would explain why
instrumentalism is not intrinsically preferable to scientific realism. Consider their fundamental inventories:
FI(instrumentalism) = {tables, rocks, cats,
dogs, moon, sun, stars, ...}. Obviously,
the list is almost endless. However:
FI(scientific realism before 1900) = {hydrogen,
helium, ... uranium}. n[FI] here is only
around 100 << n[FI(instrumentalism)].
This would explain why although postulation of a hundred types of atoms
actually increases the OI-complexity, the scientific worldview is still
considered simpler. It is because the
myriad of objects and substances seem to be reducible to combinations of these
atoms, or, in other words, the scientific worldview is FI-simpler than the
instrumentalist worldview. At one stage,
it is thought that FI(scientific worldview) = {protons, neutrons, electrons}
with a n[FI]=3. People started to talk
about the end of physics: the world became for them immensely simpler- of
course it is FI-simplicity that they are considering.[2] So
I suggest another rule is governing our explanation:
R4 Ceteris
paribus, adopt an explanation offered by a worldview which is FI-simpler.
As the progress in science shows, when we
consider the question of worldview and the fundamental entities, FI-simplicity
seems more important than OI-simplicity.
But now the debate between naturalists and theists over theistic
experiences is a question of worldview.
So FI-simplicity is more epistemically relevant here than
OI-simplicity. So let us now evaluate
the debate from this perspective.[3]
We need to distinguish between reductive naturalism
and non-reductive naturalism. The former
position asserts that the fundamental entities in physics are the only irreducible
entities in reality. Sensations, minds,
selves, etc. are either eliminated or reduced.
However, non-reductive naturalism does not think all of these are either
eliminable or reducible: some of them are irreducible. Consider their fundamental inventories:
FI(reductive naturalism) = {several kinds
of quark, electrons, ...}
FI(non-reductive naturalism) = {several
kinds of quark, electrons, ..., sensations, minds(?), ...}
FI(theism) = {God}
It
seems clear that theism is FI-simpler than reductive naturalism,[4] which is FI-simpler than non-reductive
naturalism. So if we use R4 instead of
R1, as is more appropriate here, a theistic explanation is actually simpler
than the NEs. The tension between
reductive naturalism and non-reductive type is also instructive. True, the reductive variant is FI-simpler but
the non-reductive naturalists argue that the forces of our experience cannot be
denied. So the reductive naturalist
charges that non-reductive naturalism harbours 'mysterious' entities &
urges it to return to the pristine simplicity of reductive naturalism. On the other hand, the non-reductive
naturalist accuses the reductive naturalists of reductionism, scientism &
inadequacy to our experiences. It seems
to me both complaints have some weight.
However, theism seems to be the worldview which can accommodate nicely
the awkward facts for a reductive naturalist while achieving unsurpassable
FI-simplicity. So this consideration in
the particular case of theistic experiences further overrides application of
R1. This is the second reason why P1 has
to be rejected. Indeed if FI-simplicity
is more significant than OI-simplicity, then we can formulate this rule:
R5 Ceteris
paribus, adopt an explanation offered by a worldview which is FI-simpler even
if the explanation is less OI-simple.
Because theism is FI-simpler than both
types of naturalism, R5, which is argued on independent grounds, will entail
that theistic explanation of theistic experiences is intrinsically preferable
to NEs, ceteris paribus. Anyway, we have
sufficient reasons to throw doubt on P1.
Now
P2 (see p.26) is also plagued with difficulties. First of all, we have to be sure that a NE is
really in competition with the theistic explanation before we have anything to
choose from. If a NE just offers a
partial causal account of a theistic experience & specifies some necessary
conditions for that theistic experience, then the theist can happily accept
both its truth & the truth of the theistic explanation. So for a NE to compete with the theistic one,
it has to specify causally sufficient conditions for the theistic experience
& we have seen that it is not a easy thing to do. We have also seen many drawbacks of the
prominent NEs. For all these reasons,
the truth of P2 is very dubious.
Furthermore, we should note the actual complexities of the NEs so far
offered. Firstly, there are various
sub-types of theistic experience: a plausible general NE of theistic
experience has to explain all sub-types.
However, since the sub-types of theistic experience are
phenomenologically different and occurring in different situations, presumably
quite different psychological explanations or NEs are needed for the different
sub-types of theistic experience.
Moreover, experiences of God are numerous and occur spontaneously in
most varied situations to people of almost all ages, cultures, religious
traditions, personalities, etc. My earlier
discussions suggest that a general NE which can cover all these theistic
experiences is indeed difficult to come by.
So in the end, the naturalist needs a set of disjunctive NEs. As this list grows in length, its simplicity
decreases. So it is doubtful that such a
kind of NE postulates few or fewer kinds of entities. In such a situation, it seems plausible to
say that the simplest explanation is actually that all these theistic
experiences have the same cause, God. So
even P3 is doubtful if we take the whole class of theistic experiences into
account. We have also noted that the
various sub-types of theistic experience exhibit intra-coherence on the
theistic explanation. Especially when we
consider the various types of theistic experience which occurred to a single
person, telling a coherent, meaningful and beautiful story, isn't it simpler to
explain the coherent story by the person's relationship with God? Whether these happen is an empirical matter
and there is plenty of anecdotal evidence for it. One only needs to read biographies of
religious person, e.g. that of Jackie Pullinger. If all these experiences are delusory, these
persons must be insane, which they appear not to be.
If
the above is not sufficient to establish the falsity of P2 or P3, we should
also note that simplicity is not the only consideration. Theism has another explanatory merit: the
explanans of the NEs include psychophysical laws, the structure of the human
psyche, social nature and experience of human beings, etc. but these in turn
need to be explained. I have already
argued that the naturalistic explanation of some of these is itself very
complicated and ad hoc.[5] So
the postulation of God at the same time satisfactorily explains the structure
of human psyche and the numerous theistic experiences. This is on the whole simpler than the
naturalistic scheme. My conclusion is
that on various counts theism is simpler than the NEs, and when NE is simpler
than theism in one respect, that kind of simplicity is overridden by other
considerations. Mackie's argument can be
safely rejected in the case of theistic experiences.
Naturalistic Explanations of Non-Theistic
Religious Experience
It is important to distinguish different types of
religious experience in response to the naturalistic explanation
challenge. Let us consider the
experiences of lesser deities, visions of saints and so on. It seems to me even if my criterion for
non-epistemic explanation is correct, these religious experiences are still
more vulnerable:
1) Firstly, if a causally sufficient NE is
produced, it seems enough to be evidence-canceling because it is much more
plausible to say these NEs would pre-empt the causal action of these deities.
2) Secondly, my arguments for the
simplicity of theism do not apply to these experiences. These deities are included only in the
fundamental inventory of polytheism, which has only a low degree of
FI-simplicity.
3) It is less plausible to appeal to these
deities to explain the structure of human psyche, society, etc. because they
are not the Creator.
Of
course, it doesn't imply that NEs are automatically successful unless one
revert to the a priori approach again.
The conclusion is that successful NEs of such religious experiences are
conceivable and hence the evidential force of these religious experiences more
easily defeated than that of theistic experiences. It further justifies the assimilation of
these experiences into a theistic worldview instead of changing a theistic one
into a polytheistic or henotheistic worldview.
In this aspect, NEs may well serve the purpose of theists!
I
think similar things can be said for nature mysticism or the PCE: they are more
vulnerable to the attack of NEs. The
relation of monistic experience with the project of NE is hard to say. If monistic experience really implies that
the natural world is illusory, then it has already rejected the validity of any
NE & it would be difficult for monism to accommodate the insights of many
(partial) NEs of religious experience, including monistic experience. But since the view of monists towards this
natural world can be very obscure & 'paradoxical', I do not declare upon
this matter with any confidence. I must
ask the monists themselves to clarify their stand on this issue.
I
have so far argued that if we assume that theistic experiences have PFEF, then
the naturalistic explanation objection is virtually hopeless. However, even if we reject this assumption, I
have argued that Mackie's argument is still far from being successful. There are other grounds for rejecting the
naturalist's view of burden of proof; at least it is not incumbent on the
theist to accept this view. Hence even
the naturalist, unless he has prior strong arguments for `naturalism, should be
open to the possibility that a theistic experience may well have PFEF. This means the critic can no longer complacently
assume that a NE is automatically evidence-canceling. To show that he has to justify the initial
scepticism towards theistic experiences.
The burden is also on his side.
The a priori approach to NE should be abandoned and any NE should be
subjected to empirical and philosophical scrutiny. It is at least not clear that powerful NEs
have been produced & so the naturalistic explanation objection is yet to be
shown to defeat my argument for theistic experience.
