Abbreviations
SB=Swinburne SE=sense
experience
RE=religious
experience TE=theistic
experience
In his book The
Existence of God, Richard Swinburne presents an argument from RE which
utilizes an epistemological principle which is dubbed the Principle of
Credulity:
(PC) If it
seems to me that x is present, then it is rational to believe that x is present
unless there are special considerations to the contrary.
SB argues that it is a fundamental
principle of rationality apart from which we cannot provide any noncircular
justification of either ordinary perception or memory. Then using this principle, SB formulates the
following argument for the existence of God:
A) It seems to me that God is present.
B) There is no good reason to think either
God is non-existent or not present.
C) Hence it is rational (at least for me)
to believe that God is present.
Michael
Martin, the energetic critic of theism, raises several objections to SB's
argument in an article which appeared in Religious Studies in 1988. He repeated those criticisms with a little
elaboration in his book Atheism as well.
In the following sections I would look at his objections one by one
& try to give some reply to Martin.
Michael Martin & the Negative PC
Michael
Martin raises the objection that if we grant the PC, we should also grant the
negative PC (called the NPC). For
example, we can formulate a NPC in this way: If it seems (epistemically) to a
subject S that x is absent, then probably x is absent. Then we can appeal to the fact that many
people have tried to experience God & have failed. Given the NPC, this should be good grounds
for the non-existence of God.(pp.82-3)
Hence SB's approach will at best result in a stalemate. According to Martin, the reason SB discounts
experiences of absence of God as prima facie evidence for non-existence of God
is as follows: in the case of a chair one can know under what conditions one
would see a chair if a chair was there.
But we don't know under what conditions[1]
one would see God if God existed. Martin
indeed thinks this is correct but he maintains that given this fact, both the
PC & the NPC would be undermined. (I
would discuss this last claim in a later section.)
I
don't think that Martin's challenge here is successful.[2] The reason for favoring the PC while
disowning the NPC is rooted in the asymmetry between positive & negative
existential statements with respect to empirical verification. Let C be the claim that there is a cow &
-C its negation. For C to be true, we
just need any one alleged perception of a cow to be veridical. However for -C to be verified we need to
examine all spatio-temporal locations & perceive no cow & all these
infinite number of perceptions have to be veridical. Let me call the spatio-temporal location
within which a subject can normally make reasonable perceptual judgments his perceptual
space. The NPC is only tenable when
it is confined within the perceptual space.
(Perhaps this is why Martin formulates his NPC using the predicate 'absent'
rather than 'non-existent' but he slides easily from God's absence to God's
non-existence.) Let us try a confined
version of NPC:
If it seems
epistemically to a subject S that x is absent from his perceptual space, then
it is prima facie evidence that x is absent from that perceptual space.
If this formulation is better, then when
one reports an experience of absence of X, it only has evidential force against
the presence of X in his perceptual space at the moment he makes that
claim. It can't be taken
striaghtforwardly as evidence against the existence of X in contrast
with X's presence in that space. The
case is different in a positive experience of X. Whenever the claim is made under whatever
circumstances, it is evidence for the presence of X in the perceptual space at
that moment ceteris paribus. Of
course, it could be argued that X cannot be present in that space & hence
that experience has to be illusory. This
is what happens when one's sighting of John in London is discredited by
overwhelming evidence that John could not be there at that time: say, a hundred
people testify to hearing John delivering a lecture in UCLA at that time. The point here is not that positive
experience of X is infallible. The point
is that if undefeated it is evidence for X's presence there & also
automatically evidence for X's existence. This transition is not possible for a
negative experience, save for a being whose perceptual space is unlimited. For a finite being whose perceptual space is
limited, an experience of absence of X in that finite space is not
straightforwardly evidence for X's non-existence. However, the transition can be made if a
further premise is adduced: that if X exists, then (probably) X should be present
somewhere in that perceptual space (PS).
The argument can be phrased in this way:
A) In my
perceptual space, I experience an absence of X.
NPC) Ceteris
paribus, an experience of absence is evidence against the presence of X within
that PS.
B) Hence I
have evidence against the presence of X in that PS.
C) If X
exists, X (probably) should be present in that PS.
D) Hence I
have evidence against the existence of X, ceteris paribus.
It should be clear why non-existence of
anything is quite hard to prove.
Everyone's perceptual space is severely limited. This can be partly remedied by a communal
effort & a continuous search. This
means we can build up a collective perceptual space through mutual
communication & trust. One can also
change one's PS by simply moving one's body or by launching a rocket. In this way one can check one PS after
another. However, numerous uncertainties
are there: we can't be completely sure of others' honesty or competence; in
moving from one PS to another, our limitation is only partially overcome: we
still cannot embrace both at the same time.
It is possible that when I move from PS1 to PS2, X has also moved from PS2 to PS1.
In this way, my experiences of absence of X in both PS1 & PS2 could
be accounted for.[3] So in view of these general considerations,
it seems justified to say that the existential import of the PC can normally
outweigh that of the NPC, ceteris paribus.
Even
in the case when we have a right to adopt this confined NPC, the result we get
is not as certain as that we get by applying the PC. "This is because for the positive
judgment to be reliable only one causal chain needs to go from the object
apparently perceived to the subject who seems to perceive it. But if the negative judgment is to be
reliable, causal chains need to go from all places where the object might be to
the subject who seems to perceive that the object is not present."(SB
1988, p.294) Consider the two claims:
"there seems to be a needle in the room" & "there seems to
be no needle in the room". Which
will you trust more?
It
is also the case that at each time the effective PS of a subject can be
much less than the normal PS. For
example, there is the problem of attentiveness.
One's PS is normally defined by one's capacity: it is the region in
which one can reasonably make perceptual judgment. This 'can' is predicated on the assumption of
a proper exercise of the capacity.
However, one important factor which influences the proper exercise is
attention- a sort of mental alertness directed to some region. Now if one is suddenly absorbed in thought or
carried away by a day-dream, then his effective PS would be greatly
reduced even though the normal PS is much larger: his eyes are good & there
is bright sunshine. It is common
experience that in such a situation you can approach him & remain
undetected until you are almost right in front of him. Hence when one reports an experience of
absence, we can never be sure that this experience is not due to
inattentiveness. Of course we can ask
him & check it. But this factor
still complicates the experience of absence & points to the fact that one's
effective PS can be much less than one's normal PS. It is different in the case of a positive
experience. It is perhaps an analytical
truth that when one experiences X, one's attention is on X. (cf. Moser) It does not mean that one has to put in mental
effort to achieve this attentiveness. In
many cases a positive experience just arouses & sustains the
attention. So in a way, the factor of
attention is automatically provided for by the positive experience. The case is different in an experience of
absence: normally the attention has to be kept by the person himself by an
effort. Of course, the degree of effort
needed varies with a lot of factors. Sometimes an absence can be very
conspicuous in cases of great interest & expectation, e.g. the absence of
the bride from an arranged wedding. In
this case, not much effort is needed to detect the bride's absence. In general, attentiveness is conditioned by
interest & willingness. When you are
talking to a person you find very boring or you are conversing on a topic you
don't want to engage further in, you have an uncontrollable lapse of
concentration & hence can't hear properly at all! So experience of absence is equally
susceptible to psychological explanation, say, sometimes even when you can
perceive X, you don't because you don't want to. Interest is often taken to be detrimental to
a veridical experience. It is true that
sometimes you seem to perceive something nonexistent simply because you want to
see it. But interest is by no means
always detrimental: indeed a certain amount of interest is essential for
veridical experiences. Anyway excessive
interest could blind one to genuine presence as well as create delusory sense
of presence.
There
is also the problem of the perception of transient objects whose appearance is
hard to predict. It also seems that the
PC would take priority over the NPC in this type of perceptions. Let us take the example of shooting stars. Suppose on a certain night several observers
deliberately set out to watch for shooting stars but they all reported the
experience of 'the absence of shooting stars'.
However another person reported that at certain time during that night
he just happened to look at the sky through a window & saw a shooting star. All the reports clearly are relevant to
whether there has been some shooting stars on that night. The former reports are certainly some
counter-evidence. However, it seems that
this is outweighed decisively by the positive experience. (Assuming all are sincere reports.) If this intuition is correct, then it
justifies my claim that the PC takes priority over the NPC here. The relevant factor here seems to be the
'elusiveness' of shooting stars. It is
hard to predict when they will appear & from which direction they come. Its appearance lasts hardly more than a few
seconds. These factors easily explain
why it is more difficult to come by an experience of such objects. So it also points to a real possibility that
we can have experiences of absence of that object while it is actually
present. However these factors in
themselves are not reasons for thinking that the reported experiences of such
'elusive' objects are delusory. We have
to make the distinction ./. the low probability of having the experience
& the low probability of the veridicality of that experience, given
that somebody has that experience. The
'elusiveness' of an object would count towards the former. However, it does not count towards the latter
unless the existence of such 'elusive' object is a priori improbable. I see no grounds in making this claim. Surely there is a common bias towards
extremely stable objects like a table but I submit that there is no reason why
a real object has to be like a table.
A table is a paradigm of a manipulable object & it is natural
that in our technological & materialistic culture we have a bias against
anything that can't be controlled & manipulated. It is also reflected in the epistemological
move which makes perception of a table & the like the paradigm of
perception. I have no objection if
'paradigm' is interpreted as a model of excellence but so often it is
taken to be a model of minimum requirement. Sometimes philosophers move imperceptibly
from one to another & vice versa, & I think it generates a lot of
confusions. Furthermore, contemporary
science has already moved quite far from our stable tables in the search of the
real. The atoms, the wave functions ,
etc. also seem quite elusive. Some
fundamental particles also have an extremely transient existence but they are
no less real for that. For example,
neutrinos are by nature very elusive: they are very hard to detect. Suppose we devise an experimental set-up to
detect the presence of neutrinos. In one
experiment the result is positive & in another the result is negative. Further suppose that if any of this is
spurious, we don't have any explanation.
It seems plausible to claim that the positive result is more significant
than the negative one.
I
am not saying that God is like any of the above things. If God exists, He is of course as stable as
any object can be. However, He can be
elusive with respect to our experience of Him: He cannot be manipulated
like a table can be. What I say only
serves to point out that the ontological bias towards stable &
manipulable objects itself stands in need of justification. As a summary, I propose the following
principles to arbitrate between the PC & the NPC:
P1) With
reference to existential import, PC usually outweighs NPC. (Because our PS is inescapably finite.)
P2) All
other things being equal, reports of experience of absence of X would
not outweigh reports of experience of presence of X; the latter normally
outweigh the former.
P3) All
other things being equal, if X is an elusive object, then reports of experience
of X would normally outweigh the reports of experience of absence of X.
An elusive
object is one which we can't manipulate & cannot experience it at
will. It may be so because of its
transient existence; or else it is due to the unpredictability of its behaviour
& its appearance. A shooting star is
elusive due to both reasons. A person
can be elusive due to the second reason alone.
Consider the following story.[4] During war time, I had the experience of a
secret agent who frequently appeared mysteriously to me alone & then
disappeared after a short while. No
other people seemed to have similar experiences. Certainly this secret agent is elusive but
does it mean that it is more probable that my experience of him is
unveridical? Does the fact that others
lacked similar experiences discredit my positive experiences? I think not.
Now
can we apply the above considerations to experience of absence of God? (P2) seems also applicable here. In general reports of experience of absence
of God are still open to more defeaters than reports of experience of God. (P3) also seems applicable to God because God
is also an elusive object of experience in the sense that his personal nature
& sovereign freedom make an experience of Him unmanipulable by us. The application of (P1) is not so
straightforward. It is because the idea
of a physical PS is not applicable to God.
If it is, then it could be argued that since God is everywhere God
should be present in the PS of everyone all the time. This would make the experience of absence of
God even harder to explain from the theist's perspective. Again the clue seems to be the personal
nature of God. So let us look closer at
the realm of interpersonal experience & I would argue for the coherence of
the idea of an 'interpersonal perceptual space'. I suggest this idea models better the
perceptual relationship of man & God & given this idea we can see that
though God is omnipresent, He is not automatically within everybody's
perceptual space. If this is correct,
then (P1) would also apply in the case of God.
Here I would talk about experience of other
persons & experience of their inner feelings. I am aware that this would engender some misgivings
& so let me explain what I mean by these expressions. First of all, it might be objected that
experience of other persons' feelings is impossible because one can never
really experience others' feelings from inside. Well, I think it is also true that one can
never see a table as the others see it.
What I mean by an experience of others' feelings is: 1) it epistemically
seems to me that they have such & such feelings; 2) this epistemic seeming
is accompanied by (or connected with in a more intimate sense) appropriate
sensory content & feelings. This
seems eminently possible: the experience may be unveridical but as experience
it is still real. Surely there is merit
in emphasizing that a first personal experience of feelings is primary & it
transcends a second or third personal experience of them in many ways. But the latter is still possible &
important in our lives. (It is part of
our predicament that we desperately want to communicate our feelings but find
the attempts constantly frustrated, at least partially.) Now let
us consider a subject S's experience of another person T. Surely S is prone to make some judgments
about T & these judgments can also be reasonable or unreasonable. It also seems that judgments about T can be
more or less superficial: judgments about T's appearance is more superficial than judgments about T's inner
life. (I know that my talk of inner life
would offend some philosophers but I would not apologize for it. Any person who has some in-depth experience
with another person will recognize that there is a depth to another person
which is hardly deducible from or reducible to his or her outward appearance or
behaviour: past traumatic experiences, secret wishes, inner struggles, & so
on.) So let us talk about an
interpersonal PS of S with respect to T , IPS(S,T), as the scope within which
judgments about T can reasonably be made by S.[5] What factors influence the size of
IPS(S,T)? Three things, it seems:
sensitivity & maturity of S, openness & maturity of T, & their
relationship.
1) S: it is obvious that if S is more
sensitive to personal experiences he can make more reliable judgments about
deeper aspects of T. This sensitivity
needs to be built up by life experience & a willingness to be open to
others' experience. If one is
consistently open to other persons & has rich experiences with other
persons, then we can expect him to develop a higher sensitivity which is manifested
in two aspects:
a) S can judge more reliably given a
certain basis of information about T.
b) S can pick up cues which are hardly
noticed by the less sensitive people.
It
also seems that sensitivity is both a matter of mind & heart. It involves a richer repertoire of concepts
about personality, mental states, feelings as well as larger capacity to
experience those feelings & mental states, e.g. anxiety, depression,
suppressed hatred. Reason & emotion
can hardly be divorced in this case. A
sensitive person needs both acute intellect & empathetic personality. Without the latter endowment, the former is
hardly applicable to the realm of interpersonal experience. (Ex.: a callous super-scientist.) Without the former, the person can still be a
good listener & comforter but can't make reliable judgments &
this may hamper a full, two-way communication.
Nobody is born a very sensitive person.
It is attained in a process of maturation & hence sensitivity is
also tied to the maturity of the person.
2) T: every person can be characterized by
a tendency to be either open or closed.
Some are so open to everybody that he is almost transparent. Some persons are so closed to everybody that
we can have access only to the surface of his inner life.[6] In this case no matter how sensitive is S,
IPS(S,T) would still be very small.
Sometimes the obstacle is not T's openness but his maturity. We all may have the experience that while we want to express
our feelings & inner life, we just don't know how to communicate. This inability may be overcome by a
maturation process after which T can grasp his feelings more accurately in
a more articulate manner. However, this process is again dependent on
whether T encounters some sensitive & mature persons which want to
understand him. This is a very strange
fact about interpersonal experience: our maturity seems to depend on one
another.
3) Relationship: so the most crucial factor
seems to be the relationship ./. S & T.
The prior sensitivity of S & prior openness of T are independent
factors but these might be greatly modified by the relationship. Hence the relationship is not only a
function of two independent variables S & T: it also creatively transforms
S & T. Each relationship is in a
sense unique. Take some examples. S may be in general a very sensitive person
but towards an individual T, he may not be sensitive at all. It is even possible that the relationship ./.
S & T is so strained that S comes to have gravely distorted perceptions of
T. On the other hand, T may be a very
closed person in general but there may be a unique person, S, whom he trusts
enormously & to whom he discloses almost every thought & feeling. So IPS(S,T) does not only depend on S & T
but also greatly depends on the particular relationship ./. S & T
which further hinges on the whole history of their interaction. Typically when S & T just come to know
one another, IPS(S,T) would be quite small.
If the relationship grows in mutual goodwill, then IPS(S,T) would be
enlarged. It means not only S knows more
about T's inner life; it also means that S is more capable to understand T's
motive & interpret T's cryptic sayings & the like. An ability or a disposition is built up. This does not seem to be easily
transferable. It is difficult for S to
transfer his knowledge of T to S': much of it is tacit & unverbalized or
unverbalizable. Even when such knowledge
is transferable, it is dubious that S' would thereby be enabled to know T as
well as S does. The information might be
transferable but the ability is not.
Relationship
is a tricky matter. Rarely there is
linear progress. IPS may well dwindle
because of conflicts & prolonged misunderstanding. An enlarging IPS depends on mutual trust
& willingness to see & feel things as the other sees & feels. This is by no means easy & sometimes to
avoid it one may just assert one's viewpoint (perhaps it is threatening to
one's self-image) & denies the validity of the other's.
It
is also the case that the effective IPS is only the subset of the normal
IPS. Even when a husband should be able
to understand the implicit complaint of his wife, it may not be true in a
particular case. He may be simply
inattentive or lacking in care. On the
other hand, even when two persons have developed a very close relationship
& the normal IPS is quite large, T may deliberately withhold some feeling
from S on a particular occassion for some reason. In both cases, the effective IPS would be
reduced at that point & either S or T can effect this reduction.
So
if my concept of a IPS is intelligible, then let us use it to illuminate a
subject S's experience of presence or absence of God. Let G stands for God & let us consider
IPS(S,G). The problem is that for some
S, IPS(S,G) is an empty set. How are we
going to explain it? (cf. Davis, p.99) The first thing to be noted is that God is an
immaterial person. Whereas embodied
persons are tied to a certain physical body & some of their mental
states are more or less linked to observable behaviour, it is not so for
God. This means that when we are in
contact with an embodied person T, we can make judgments about T in a quite
detached way without involvement & commitment. Hence even when S is not interested to know
T, IPS(S,T) is rarely an empty set. (It
should be clear that in this case, IPS(S,T) would hardly be more than a small
set.) It is different with God. When we feel God's presence in any intimate
way[7],
we are also entering into a relationship with God. However, to acknowledge this presence would
entail a lot of change in self-understanding & worldview, isn't it natural
that some people who are unwilling to do so would suppress this feeling? (cf. Kellenberger) There are also many cases when people are
just totally absorbed in secular concerns & egoistic pursuits. Their experience of the absence of God can be
easily explained by their sheer inattentiveness. However the problem is more serious in two
cases: 1) when great evils occur, a loving God is expected to intervene &
let His presence be felt, & 2) the honest & arduous seekers after God
which fail to experience God. The former
does need some explanation but I can't go into theodicy here. In the latter case (e.g. Michael Goulder), we
can never be sure that one is completely honest. However, perhaps we should also see the
problem from God's side. When people are
not ready or willing to experience Him, God's refraining from imposing His
Light on them seems eminently understandable: just respecting their
choices. However, when the people are
willing, what 's the right time to reveal Himself? Not all seekers immediate experience God: the
process can be very long & the search contributes to the richness of the
personal life & human experience.
God sometimes seems to act in dramatic ways. It does not obviously seem to be a greater
good that God immediately & mechanically reveals Himself. It is not due to God's capricious feelings
but due to His creativity & 'strange ways'.
As a summary, when IPS(S,G) is an empty set, several reasons are
plausible: 1) S's inattentiveness reduces it to empty set or 2) S is unwilling
to enter into a relationship with God & God respects this freedom or 3)
though God will reveal to S, it is not yet the right time. For example, while God is anonymously guiding
S, God knows that it is better to reveal more explicitly to S after S has a
certain personality development or 4) not everybody needs to have 'emotional'
experience of God; a faith that is nurtured on other grounds is possible for S. (?)
Now
suppose we still have residual cases which are hard to explain in this
way. I think it is probably true but
what epistemological relevance does it have?
I still think that the PC would take priority over NPC in this type of
interpersonal experience. In general,
IPS(S,T) depends on both S & T & a lot of other factor. For example, suppose we are considering the
case whether T has a traumatic memory which causes him a deep sorrow. It is typically difficult to know whether it
is true from the outside & it is also difficult to predict under what
circumstances he would display it in behaviour or discloses it verbally to
someone else. So if S lacks any such
experience, it is not very good evidence for the thesis that he has no such
traumatic memory. On the other hand, if
S has such experience of T's disclosure, then it is pretty good evidence that T
has such traumatic memory. Now if God is
conceived as the Supreme Person, then isn't it presumptuous that we can predict
when He would make such & such a revelation? So on analogy with our ordinary
interpersonal experience, it is plausible to claim that experience of absence
of God is less significant than experience of God. Besides the lesser scope & force of the
NPC, let us further consider the intricate factors which contribute to the
reduction of IPS, the sovereign freedom & immensely higher wisdom of God,
the good of dramas of life & so on[8]. I submit that even a single experience of God
is not outweighed by a single experience of absence of God, ceteris
paribus. Furthermore, it seems to me the
proportion of seekers who succeed in finding God is higher than those who
fail. Perhaps the successful seekers are
self-deluded. It seems that the sceptic
must adopt some similar explanation to explain away the experiences. Now if it is a must, then there is no reason
why we can't explain that there is also delusion in those failed 'seekers'.[9] Though I feel quite uncharitable in
proffering this explanation, I find that this is forced on me in some sense:
the successful seekers & the failed seekers can't be both right. Whereas the atheists have to interpret
the 'successful' seekers as being deluded, the successful seekers actually do
not need to do the same: they may just appeal to God's inscrutable ways with
men & the unfathomable mystery of every relationship, & to the future
revelation of God to those honest seekers.
If the atheist finds this unsatisfactory, then he may well consider the
above uncharitable explanation. Perhaps
the seekers are just curious & they never intend to develop a serious
relationship with God? Perhaps despite
their surface claims, they have unconscious desires to avoid God? Perhaps ...
If I am right that there are more successful seekers than failed ones
& if the less people are deluded the more charitable the interpretation,
then perhaps we should better accept that it is the failed seekers who are
deluded. Hence arguably even in that
case evidential force of REs will only be lessened & not cancelled completely.
So
this objection of Martin fails.
No Criteria Objection
The
most common criticism of SB is the claim that the PC is only applicable when we
have rational criteria to distinguish the veridical experiences from the
unveridical ones. For example Rowe
repudiates SB's PC & formulates this one instead:
"When subjects
have an experience which they take to be of x, & we know how to discover
positive reasons for thinking their experiences delusive, if such reasons do
exist, then it is rational to conclude that they really do experience x unless
we have some positive reasons to think their experiences are
delusive."(p.91)[10]
Martin
presses a similar objection & he is clearer in his rationale. He alleges that "neither PC nor NPC
should apply unless one has a right to assume that perceptual conditions hold
under which the entity at issue is likely to appear to an observer if the
entity is present. This right may be
justified on inductive grounds, by one's background theory or in other
ways." (pp.85-6) Consider ordinary
perception first. Let T be "there
is a table in front of me" & C1 be "a certain perceptual condition"
& A1 be "a table appears to S". That the PC is applicable in such a case is
because we know:
(1) If T
& C1,
then A1.
(5) If -T
& C1,
then probably -A1.
So given -A1 & C1, then -T. Also given A1 & C1, then probably T. That is why "a table appears to S"
is good evidence for "there is a table" & why "there is no
table appearing to S" is good
evidence for "there is no table before S". However in the case of alleged perception of
God, the conditions under which God will appear to S, if he exists, are
unknown. In this case no argument
similar to (1) & (5) above can be offered.
"In our ignorance it surely seems illegitimate to suppose that an
appearance of God is grounds for supposing God exists."(p.85) So Martin is claiming that the PC is not a fundamental
principle of rationality. It is only
applicable when we can offer inductive grounds or other support for it in
certain cases.
This
is a very common & important objection which deserves to be dealt with
seriously. Let us come back to Rowe's
objection first. We must ask why does
absence of criteria matter & what sort of criteria are relevant here? As it stands the claim that there is no
criterion at all to distinguish the veridical REs from the delusory ones is
false. Consider such criteria (Losin,
p.66):
a) good consequences: leading to or
reinforcing a new life marked by such virtues as wisdom, charity & humility
b) effect on others
c) depth, profundity, & the
"sweetness" of the experience
d) agreement with orthodox talk
e) resemblance to paradigmatic mystical
experiences
f) consideration of pronouncements of
authority
It is just not true that the God-experient
will accept every experience of God as veridical.
However,
it may be replied that there are no external & non-circular
criteria. All such criteria depend
heavily on religious beliefs which are supposed to be justified by REs. For example, Martin comments on the test of
scriptural compatibility & asserts that it won't do because it
"already presumes that the Bible is the revealed word of God & therefore
that the Christian God exists, it cannot be used to support an argument from RE
for the existence of God." (Atheism, p.160)
So
though Martin doesn't "wish to deny that (PC) operates in ordinary life
& science", he thinks "there are more limitations on its use than
Swinburne imagines, & they need to be more tightly drawn". (Atheism,
p.186) His aim is to restrict the PC so
as to reject REs while avoiding scepticism.
The basic restrictions he proposes seem to be twofold.[11] Firstly a necessary condition for the
PC to be applicable is that we have knowledge of the perceptual
conditions of veridicality of a kind of perception: "For example, in order
to be able to justify my spontaneous perceptual belief that there is a brown
table in front of me, it would seem to be necessary[12]
in principle to be able to argue thus: Spontaneous beliefs of a certain sort
occurring under certain conditions are usually true, & my belief that there
is a brown table in front of me is of this sort & occurs under these
conditions. Consequently, my belief is
probably true." (Atheism, p.157; italics mine.) Secondly, another necessary condition
is that there are tests for veridical or unveridical perceptions which are non-circular. This requirement should be clear from the
above quote on 'the test of scriptural compatibility'. Now Martin is right that were we to subscribe
to such criteria, the independent evidential force of REs would be greatly
endangered. Yet it is not clear that
Martin's sanguine claim that "this would not result in skepticism about
ordinary objects" (Atheism, p.185) is then justifiable.
The
reason is that all criteria used for sifting away the unveridical perceptions
depend upon sensory experiences & assume anyway the existence of the
external world, the "thing" framework, & so on. Take again Martin's example of seeing a
table. Consider premise (1): If T &
C1, then
A1. Presumably C1 will include "the lighting is
normal" & "S is attentive
& his sensory equipment is functioning normally". We must ask how do we come to know (1) by
induction. I think the answer is
something like this: "We observe that in many cases when there is a table
& the lighting is normal & S is attentive & his sensory equipment
is functioning, we hear S telling us that he appears to see a table." The problems become crystal clear as soon as
this answer is spelt out. How are we
supposed to know any of these things without assuming some of our perceptual
claims are at least "innocent until proven guilty", not to mention
the problems of justifying our interpreting some sounds emitted from a body as
a testimony? Furthermore, for the
argument to be completed, we also need to assert that C1 actually obtains. Again how on earth are we going to know
it? It seems that we can only check the
lighting by our eyes. We can check our
attentiveness by introspection. We could
check our sensory equipment by doing some surgery but it is rarely done in
practice. The problem of vicious
circularity still remains: if I need to justify my application of PC to my
'seeing the table' by further premises & inference, by parity don't
we also need to justify the premises in the inference? They seem to belong to the same type of
perception which is in need of justification.
This problem is so obvious & familiar that I find it very surprising
Martin never tries to bring it out. When
further arguments & illumination are required, he simply asserts that
"knowledge is available about when chairs will appear if they
exist" (Atheism, p,185; italics mine)
He also assures us that there are "various ways" in which
"the skeptical questions" can be "silenced". (Atheism,
p.186) These claims are totally
mystifying to me & I wish Martin had spelt them out. Certainly a theory 'about when chairs
will appear if they exist' is available.
It is just not clear how this theory can be transformed into knowledge. Perhaps there are ways that skepticism
can be defeated but it does not seem likely given the above necessary
conditions of application of the PC.
It looks as if Martin is so eager to defeat REs that he unhesitatingly
lays down the above stringent conditions.
But when the skeptical consequences begin to loom large, he simply
asserts or hedges. Perhaps my
interpretation is unfair but anyway Martin still owes us an account how he can
hold to both the application of PC to ordinary life & the above conditions
of applicability. In the meantime, we
are justified to ask the question: "how (1) or (5) are to be known?"[13] to which Martin does not give any
answer.
However,
let us try to explore further the possible answers to the above question. In the above paragraph, I have briefly
discussed the possibility that (1) is established by induction. This seems hopelessly circular. Another answer could be that the relevant
criteria are conceptually derived from the ontology of physical objects in
space-time. Gale seems to adopt a
similar line. He argues that all the
relevant tests can be derived from the nature of physical objects &
space-time. His discussion certainly
shows further the coherence of SE but it is dubious he has shown more than
that. He argues that if physical objects
have such & such nature, the tests for veridical SE can then be
derived. However, it still does not show
that when those tests are passed the SE in question is then proved
veridical. Such coherence in itself does
not rule out the sceptical alternatives.
Perhaps the evil scientist is also a good philosopher: he first lays
down some ontological descriptions of the nature of 'physical objects' &
then derives the principles which govern the 'veridicality' or 'unveridicality'
of SEs. These principles are then used
as the most basic axioms of his program which governs the inputs to a
brain-in-a-vat. (Of course he also needs
to draft some contingent causal laws which conform to the axioms.) In this way all the experiences of the
brain-in-a-vat would indeed conform to Gale's theory of SE. Perhaps the brain-in-a-vat also reasons as
Gale does & concludes that all his experiences must be real? This would only make the evil scientist
laugh!
It
is a further question how Gale's understanding of physical objects is derived
from the first place? Perhaps we can
rely on the grasp of some a priori necessary truths.[14] But the experiences themselves are also
indispensable. Without prior trust in
those experiences, can we trust the theory derived from them? Again a vicious circularity threatens.
Let
us look at some more concrete example.
We seem to see a bending stick when part of a straight stick is immersed
in water. We would count that an
illusion while taking the perception of the straight stick as veridical. This distinction is taught to us since our
early days & most of us would take it for granted. But can we give an account of the reasons for
this move? Let us not first take into
consideration of the science of optics.
If the optical account of the illusion is necessary for the above
distinction, then we are denying the right of most of our ancestors to make
this distinction. This seems most
implausible. If we just consider the
more common sense response, then probably most of us would perhaps say that the
reason why the apparent perception of a bent stick is illusory is as follows:
"If we take the stick out of the water, the stick again looks
straight. Furthermore, if we grope for the
stick partly immersed in water, it still feels straight. Therefore it must remain straight although it
seems to be bent." Now it has to be
noted that this account is by no means the only possible one. For the first reason to be conclusive, it has
to make two more assumptions: firstly,
the visual perceptions are veridical; secondly, the shape of the stick has
remained constant throughout the process.
If we are prepared to grant that the stick is bent when it is
partly immersed in water & it is straight when all of it is
out of the water, then we can insist that both perceptions of a straight stick
& a bent one are veridical. The
tactual experience by itself is compatible with this account: we can insist
that vision is more reliable than tactual experience. Now the tactual experience & the visual
experience of the stick partly immersed in water seem incompatible[15]
with one another. Why can't we take the
tactual experience as illusory instead of the visual one? I take it that it is difficult to establish
conclusively that this re-interpretation must be incorrect. It seems to me we choose the common way of
interpretation because we have presupposed two rational principles:
Other things being
equal, we should choose an interpretation of experience which fits with the
simpler ontology.
Other things being
equal, we should choose an interpretation of experience which would render more
of our perceptual experiences veridical.
The
second principle in itself is not sufficient: both interpretations would need
to render some experience illusory & it does not decidedly favor the common
sense interpretation. However, the
common sense interpretation posits a sort of stick which would not suddenly
change shape when immersed in water & this ontology is simpler. Someone may object that a stick is just not
the type of object that would easily change shape. This piece of knowledge, it might be argued,
is the foundation of our common sense interpretation of experience rather than
my alleged rational principles. This
reply won't do. It may seem obvious to
us that the above statement about the stick is true but it is only so because
it is repeatedly confirmed in our experiences.
But given that our experiences can be illusory, can we decide what
is confirmed by our conflicting experiences unless we have a way to distinguish
which experiences should be counted as veridical & which illusory? The answer seems to be no. If so, then the above principles seem to be basic
principles of experiential interpretation in accordance with which we posit the
veridical-illusory distinction. The
first one is effectively a form of the Principle of Simplicity. The second can be seen to be a corollary of
the PC. If so, then the PC & the
Credulity Approach would nicely account for the way we make the
veridical-illusory distinction. Now it
is true that consideration of ontology comes in when we make the
veridical-illusory distinction but this distinction is still prior to the knowledge
of the nature of the physical world. To
gain such knowledge we need to justify it by veridical experiences &
hence before we can know which claims can be regarded as knowledge we need to
decide which experiences are veridical.
If the above argument is roughly correct, then the more plausible
account of the 'whence' of our criteria of SE would fit in better with the view
that the PC is a fundamental principle.
Now
I want to discuss the role of science in confirming our common sense way of
making the veridical-illusory distinction.
I have earlier raised the question why the visual experience is taken to
be illusory rather than the tactual experience of it. One powerful reason for this is provided by
the theory of geometrical optics because it gives a more detailed explanation
of the visual illusion by positing the process of refraction of light rays by
water. On the other hand, if we take the
interpretation that the stick is bent when partly immersed in water, we do not
have explanations why the bending occurs & how the alleged tactual illusion
of straightness occurs. However I take
this to be a contingent matter. Perhaps
such explanations are not available because they have never been sought: we
have already decided that the bending is not probable. It does not mean however that it is not
possible that the immersion in water would cause the bending of the stick. It just isn't the case & this is
confirmed by the scientific explanations.
So another principle seems to be involved:
If two
interpretations of experience both render some experiences illusory, the
interpretation which gives better explanations of the alleged illusions is to
be preferred.
Why
do we need the tests? They may be needed
to provide the conceptual distinction ./. a veridical experience in that type
from an unveridical one. If it is the
case, then we can further ask: "How precise do they need to be?" The critics like Martin & Gale seem to
demand that the criteria have to be very precise & fully determinate in every
situation. (It is dubious whether the
tests of SE can satisfy this demand.)
This seems unreasonable. There is
no obvious reason that for a type of experience to be roughly reliable, we must
have such precise tests. In many other
situations, we can make objective distinctions without having precise criteria:
legal judgment, choice of large scale scientific theories, judgments of others'
personality & motive, etc. (Ghost of
verificationism?)
Martin
also makes much of the problem of underdetermination in REs. This is correct as far as the identification
of the problem goes. However, if Martin
suggests that this would destroy the cognitive value of REs, then again he must
give us an account how underdetermination does not damage induction &
science.
In
the end such objections may only betray the bias that all experiences should be
checkable by criteria similar to those used in sensory perception.[16] The reply of Losin is apt: "Rowe has
simply assumed that reasons drawn from experiences of God cannot themselves be
"reasons for thinking that particular experiences of God are
delusive," that experiences of God cannot themselves provide a (fallible
& provisional) means for the critique of other such experiences. I see no reason to think that this assumption
is true, & good reason to think that, when suitably amended & applied
to sensory experience, it is false. Nor
do I see the slightest reason why we cannot use knowledge or beliefs about God
not gleaned from experience of God to identify & dismiss particular
experiences of God as non-veridical."(p.69)
Conclusion
Martin’s criticisms of the argument from RE
are not convincing.
[1] This claim needs to be understood carefully. In a sense, at least we can lay down
conditions when it is probable that one would see God: a) when God decides to
reveal Himself & judges that this is the most appropriate time to do so,
& b) when the person is spiritually ready to see God (assuming God respects
human freedom). Of course these
conditions are vague. They are neither
manipulable nor ascertainable by us. But
what is the reason to think that this renders the alleged experiences of God
unveridical? Why is it the case that the
perceptual conditions of a veridical experience must be manipulable &
ascertainable by us? I would expand this
point later.
[2]. Indeed I think there were adequate replies already: Davis,
pp.97-9; SB 1988, p.294.
[3] One can also enlarge one's perceptual space by tools &
equipment. A stick is very useful for
enlarging one's tactual space. The other
point: the perceptual space is also dependent on the modality of perception:
one's auditory space does not coincide with one's visual space & both are
normally much bigger than one's tactual space.
Gustatory or olfactory space is usually very limited.
[4] I owe the idea to a suggestion of Swinburne in conversation.
[5] When one makes judgments about oneself, we can talk about IPS(S,S)
or IPS(T,T), a sort of introspective or reflective space. It is an interesting question about the
relation between IPS(S,T) & IPS(T,T).
It might be thought that the former has to be a subset of the
latter. This seems incorrect. S can make reasonable judgments about T's
appearance while T is less easy to do so.
Furthermore suppose S is a psychiatrist & T is his client. It is possible that S can make reasonable
judgments about some of T's deep motives whereas T is still blind to them. But even in this case, there is still a large
area of IPS(T,T) which is never accessible to S. I tend to think that it is never the case
that IPS(T,T) is a subset of IPS(S,T) except when S is God.
[6] Physical pain is actually on the surface of one's inner life. It makes its reality so hard to deny but it
also makes the Wittgensteinian analysis easier.
On the other hand, deeper mental episodes like traumatic memory would be
hardly congenial to such analysis. Hence
the reductionist is likely to deny their reality, say, by adopting an
attribution theory of emotions: emotions are nothing more than
self-attributions or interpretations & they do not refer, strictly
speaking.
[7] Perhaps there is a more 'mechanical' or 'oblique' way to feel the
presence of God. Perhaps God is present
in man's moral or aesthetic experience as well.
Perhaps God is present but incognito.
I'll explore this theme in some details in ch.9.
[8] Perhaps the Christian doctrine of sin is also relevant here. In Romans 1, Paul talks of the blinding
effect of sin & the Calvinists are adamant on the noetic effects of
sin. If this is the case, then
experiential knowledge of God is inseparable from the process of redemption
because the human capacity of perceiving God is lost after the Fall & only
restored by grace. Perhaps it is true
but in the main text I want to argue that we can have general grounds apart
from the above doctrine to think that the experiences of absence of God are not
significantly diminishing the evidential force of experiences of God.
[9] It is strange that while Martin is enthusiastic with his
psychological hypothesis of the experience of God, he never considers the
possibility of a psychological hypothesis of the experience of absence of God.
[10]. Actually Rowe's formulation is not as careful as it should
be. In his paper he discusses some
reasons for thinking that God does not exist or the experiences are delusory. To exclude REs by his version of PC, which is
his purpose, we have to interpret the "reasons for thinking their
experiences delusive" as the perceptual conditions under which we are
justified to think that the experiences are delusory.
[11] Martin also endorses Gutting's proposed restriction. I also endorse it & would discuss it
later.
[12] Elsewhere he says "Whether this should actually be made a
condition of application is not clear."(Atheism, p.173) This tentativeness is in contradiction with
the above quote & the general tone of his objection.
[13]. I think it is also a mistake by Martin to think that the
perceptual conditions in (1) & (5) are the same. The conditions required by (5) could be much
more complicated than those in (1), e.g. including "there is no deceiving
demon" & "S is not a brain in a vat." That means C1 in (5) is almost unascertainable unless we
rule out all sceptical alternatives from the very beginning.
[14] Gale indeed appeals to some necessary truths but it is not clear
how he understands the nature of such necessary truths.
[15] Actually as experiences they are only incompatible when we
interpret them realistically: there is a real world with objects who have
determinate properties & the experiences' propositional content should be
taken seriously as indicator of the properties of those real objects. If either presupposition is removed, it is
not clear in what sense the experiences are not compatible.
[16] This is a kind of Disanalogy Objection to religious experiences
& I will discuss this in full in chapter 10.
