Kai-man Kwan
The Critical Trust Approach to Religious Experience
In
recent years, there is a revival of the argument from religious experience
among analytic philosophers of religion. Richard Swinburne gave it
epistemological sophistication by propounding and defending the Principle of
Credulity (PC) which says:
(PC) If it seems (epistemically) to one that x
is present, then probably x is present unless there are special considerations
to the contrary.[1]
While
William Alston does not agree with Swinburne on many (minor) points, his
Doxastic Practice Approach to religious experience is structurally similar to
Swinburne's. His Perceiving God is an impressive work which elaborates
and defends this approach by arguing that it is practically rational to regard
all socially established doxastic practices as prima facie reliable.[2]
I will call this kind of approach the Critical Trust Approach (CTA). The
Principle of Credulity is renamed The Principle of Critical Trust (PCT).
The name highlights two major and interdependent components of this
epistemology: 1) initial trust of our experiences; 2) critical examination of
those experiences to see whether they are subject to defeaters. (The latter
component is worth emphasizing because many tend to associate Swinburne's
Principle of Credulity or Alston's Doxastic Practice Approach with uncritical
blind trust.)[3]
Although I argue that the PCT should be applied to all religious experiences,
i.e., they are prima facie justified, I have no intention to defend the thesis
that they are in the end all veridical. In this paper my defense will focus on
a sub-type of religious experience, the experience of God or theistic
experience (TE in short).
While
Plantinga’s externalist approach is quite different from Swinburne’s broadly
internalist one, his epistemology also has some parallels with the CTA. He
says, “Prior to philosophical
reflection, … most of us assume that many of our perceptual judgments do
constitute knowledge; this assumption is one of those natural starting points
for thought …; and the rational stance is to accept it unless there are
sufficiently powerful arguments against it” (Plantinga 1993, 90). So Plantinga
seems to agree that our sense experience (SE) is prima facie justified.
Moreover, he thinks that in SE “there is a
sort of nonsensuous experience involved as well, an experience distinct from
the sensuous experience but nonetheless connected with the formation of the
belief in question. That belief has a certain felt attractiveness or naturalness,
a sort of perceived fittingness; it feels like the right belief in those
circumstances” (Plantinga 1993, 92). This can be regarded as a kind of “impulsional
evidence”: “a sort of felt
inclination or impulsion toward a certain belief”; “suppose we add this
inclination to believe, this believed attractiveness, or inevitability, or
fittingness of the proposition in question in the situation in question:
suppose we think of that as evidence as well… then whenever it seems to
you that something is so, you do indeed have evidence for it” (Plantinga 1993,
192). This idea in fact has affinity with Swinburne’s concept of epistemic
seeming, and the last statement is similar to the PCT. Of course, Plantinga
insists that impulsional evidence is not sufficient for warrant: “there must
also be proper function” (Plantinga 1993, 193).
Lastly, Plantinga thinks that this kind of
nonsensuous experience (impulsional evidence) is not only present in SE, but
also associated with our memory beliefs, a priori beliefs, beliefs about
the mental states of other persons, inductive beliefs, testimonial beliefs,
moral beliefs and belief in God. In this way Plantinga is moving towards a kind
of Reidian foundationalism which takes many kinds of beliefs to be
properly basic (Plantinga 1993, 183-84). This is again structurally similar
with Alston’s Doxastic Practice Approach and Swinburne’s CTA. It is interesting
to observe that while Swinburne, Alston and Plantinga differ in their formal
epistemological approaches, they in the end come to the same conclusion that a
narrow kind of empiricism is untenable, and we should broaden our epistemic
base quite a lot.
Alston’s
argument can be regarded as a kind of Transcendental Argument for Theistic
Experience (TA) which can be formulated in this way:
TA1) Any justification from experience is
possible only when the PCT is presupposed.
TA2) Hence the PCT should be applied to all kinds
of experience.
TA3) Hence the PCT should be applied to TE, i.e.,
it is prima facie justified.
TA4) Not all TEs have been defeated, i.e., shown to
be delusory.
TA5) Therefore,
some TEs are ultima facie justified.
It
should be noted that the Transcendental Argument for Theistic Experience (TA)
is different from the Analogical Argument for Theistic Experience (hereafter
abbreviated as AA) which has also been put forward by some theists:
AA1) Sense experiences are prima facie justified.
AA2) Theistic experiences (TEs) are
sufficiently analogous with sense experiences.
AA3) Hence TEs are also prima facie justified.
According
to John Hick, "Many of us today who work in the philosophy of religion are
in broad agreement with William Alston that the most viable defense of
religious belief has to be a defense of the rationality of basing belief (with
many qualifying provisos which Alston has carefully set forth) on religious
experience."[4] Of course, there are also many who reject
this approach. In this paper, I will look at one important objection raised by
Evan Fales concerning the need for cross-checking.[5]
Evan
Fales’ “No Cross-checking Objection”
Fales
and Alston have an interesting debate on the validity of religious experience
in the recently published Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion
(Fales 2004; Alston 2004). Fales vigorously presses a kind of “No
Cross-checking Objection” (NCO) against Alston:
NCO1) Any kind of perceptual experience is prima
facie justified only if it can be cross-checked.[6]
NCO2) Religious experience is prima facie
justified only if it can be cross-checked.
NCO3) Religious experience cannot be (adequately)
cross-checked.
NCO4)
Therefore, religious experience is not prima facie justified.[7]
The
conclusion NCO4 follows from the preceding premises, and it contradicts both
TA3 and AA3 in the above arguments. NCO2 is a special case of the general claim
NCO1. So the crucial premises here are NCO1 and NCO3. They will be critically
examined later. Now let us first clarify the concept of cross-checking. Fales
explains, “Let ‘cross-checking’ denote all those procedures and strategies we
use to settle questions about the causes of something. …(1) using Mill’s
methods to pick out causally relevant antecedent conditions; (2) exploiting the
fact that events have multiple effects, to ‘triangulate’ the event in question,
on the principle that qualitatively different causes will have some differences
in their (potential) effects; and (3) confirming the existence of causal
mechanisms allegedly connecting a cause to its effects (when it is not a
proximate cause). …putting forward hypotheses and testing them by means of
diagnostic experiments” (Fales 2004, 147-48).
NCO1
says that the availability of crosschecking is a necessary condition for any
perceptual experience to be prima facie justified: “cross-checking…is a
mandatory feature of any recruitment of perceptual experience to epistemic
ends” (Fales 2004, 147).[8]
But why does Fales think so? The necessity of cross-checking “derives largely
from the general truth that any effect – hence a perceptual experience – can be
caused in more ways than one” (Fales 2004, 147). So “what a perceiver takes to
be present on the basis of her experiences might not be what is in fact
causally responsible for those experiences” (Fales 2004, 152). To remove this
ambiguity we need cross-checking. This “is a matter of narrowing down the
candidate causes of an experience so that – ideally – just one cause, situated
in the right way can explain our data. It is precisely here that cross-checking
plays the crucial role by enabling us to eliminate possible causes and to form
a sufficiently precise conception of our environment and the causal processes
that occur in it to “zero in” on the (or a) ‘suitable’ cause” (Fales 2004,
150).
Now
there is an obvious objection: “Perceptual knowledge seems much more direct
than this accounts allows it to be.” However, Fales thinks that “this is an
illusion, that in fact warrant accrues to perceptual beliefs only insofar as,
rationally reconstructed, their acquisition, too, requires inference to the
best explanation” (Fales 2004, 149). Only because “[i]n everyday contexts,
cross-checking is … so automatic, continuous, and pervasive that…it is scarcely
noticed” (Fales 2004, 147). The above phenomenological objection ignores “what
we might call ‘subliminal information processing,’ both past and occurrent, and
the vital role that cross-checking plays in this processing. What sort of
perceptual seemings a given environment can produce in one is a function not
only of recent sensory stimulation, but of much else: of attention and
motivational factors, of past experience and concepts thereby acquired, of
expectations for which an inductive rationale could be supplied if required”
(Fales 2004, 150).
Another
crucial premise is NCO3 which asserts that religious experience can’t be
cross-checked. Fales argues that “mystical experiences are not public. Moreover,
the sorts of checks typically invoked, by Christian mystics at least, are
either epistemically irrelevant or question begging, absent quite strong
auxiliary assumptions” (Fales 2004, 155). For example, he discusses Teresa of
Avila’s four tests: (1) the fruits of an experience – both in the actions and
personally of the mystic and as producing an inner peace rather than a troubled
state of mind, (2) the vividness of the memory of the experience, (3)
conformity to scripture, and (4) validation by the mystic’s confessor.” His
major criticism is that “most such tests aim at social acceptance within the
religious community. These, and all the other tests of which I know, are such
that passing them is largely under the control of the mystic or of her religious
community. Thus, unlike proper cross-checks, they do not risk invalidation of
the tested hypothesis by an uncooperative tester-independent world” (Fales
2004, 156). So “such cross-checks as have been performed on MEs do not confirm
them. Those cross-checking procedures that are internal to mystical practices
are (with one exception) not of a sort that could genuinely confirm MEs,
because they either have no apparent evidential bearing at all, or because they
can be brought to bear only by making ancillary theological assumptions that
are themselves not subject to independent tests, or because they confirm at
least equally well some naturalistic hypothesis. …Nor are there cross-checking
procedures external to mystical practice that support it. Indeed, until theists
formulate serious, testable hypotheses concerning the manner in which God
provides theophanies, there is not much that can be done along these lines”
(Fales 2004, 163).
Prelimimary
Clarification of Fales’ Objection
Fales
emphasizes that “not all mystical experiences can be relied upon; many are the
stuff of delusion. So they have somehow to be checked out…they must indeed be
cross-checked to serve as good evidence” (Fales 2004, 146). The major complaint
seems to be that we have no (clear or precise) criteria to find out which TEs,
if they are delusive, are really so. I call these criteria of veridicality
(abbreviated as CV). In particular Fales thinks that the CV have to include the
ability to be cross-checked, and he objects that this criterion of veridicality
is not applicable in the case of TEs. This objection can take many forms, and
the allegation of ‘no cross-checking’ can mean several things:
1) no
cross-checking at all!
2) no
cross-checking which is non-circular!
3) no
cross-checking which is like that of SE!
The
second and third claims are at least implicit in some of Fales’ comments. Fales
does not press the first claim because he knows this claim is apparently false.
For example, Fales discusses the tests suggested by Teresa of Avila. So it is
just not true that the God-experient will accept every experience of God (TE)
as veridical.
The
reason why lack of criteria is regarded as damaging is again not uniform. In
relation to the TA, the no cross-checking objection can conceivably cut in
several ways:
1) It
can be meant to show that the PCT or the like should not or need not be applied
to TE. It would be a denial of the premise (TA3).
2)
It can be meant to show that either TE is unreliable or unjustifiable, i.e., it
would amount to a denial of the premise (TA4). This can be due to different
reasons:
a)
Criteria of veridicality are intrinsically related to the reliability or
justifiability of a type of experience.
b)
Lack of criteria of veridicality shows an invidious disanalogy with SE.
Fales
seems to argue for both of the above objections.
Type-
veridicality, Token-veridicality and Type-reliability
In
order to clarify the issues, I propose to make the distinction between
type-veridicality and token-veridicality. Type-veridicality is the
verisimilitude of the basic ontology of the type of experience. So
theistic experience is type-veridical if there is a being whose nature is quite
like that of God, as believed by the major theistic traditions. In contrast, we
can consider the token-veridicality of a particular theistic experience, e.g.,
Paul's vision of the Resurrected Christ. We can further define
'type-reliability' of a type of experience as the probability of a token of
that type to be veridical. Clearly this is a continuous variable which takes a
value from 0 to 1. When we say loosely that a type of experience is
type-reliable, it may mean only that the probability is larger than 0.5. The
question of type-veridicality is in principle separable from the question of
token-veridicality. One case of token-veridicality is sufficient to establish
the type-veridicality. So the type-veridicality of a type is compatible with
gross unreliability of the type. However, even in this case the type of
experience is not necessarily absolutely unreliable and evidentially
irrelevant. In this essay, when I speak of a type-veridical experience, it is
also implied that at least a handful of the tokens are veridical.
Let
us now raise the question of the epistemological relevance of the CV. Consider
this argument:
A) If
there are no CV to distinguish the veridical tokens from the unveridical ones,
then we can't know which tokens are veridical.
B) If
we can't know which tokens are veridical, then we can't know whether the type
is veridical.
C)
Hence if there are no tests or cross-checking, then we can't know the
type-veridicality thesis.
The
general idea is that for a type of experience to be evidential, tokens of it
have to be evidential. However, if we allow that the tokens can be
unveridical, then only the veridical tokens can be evidential. But if we can't
distinguish the veridical tokens from the unveridical, then we have no access
to the evidential base. Perhaps this kind of reasoning is behind the No
Cross-checking Objection to TE. If the objection is interpreted in this way,
one reply is that we do have CV for TE which are established in analogous ways
to the case in SE. I will explore this later. Now I suggest that we do not need
to decide the token-veridicality in each and every case before the type-veridicality
thesis can be judged to be plausible. To make a case for the latter, we only
need to show that it is unreasonable to believe that token-unveridicality is
universal. Consider this argument:
D) If
any token of a type is token-veridical, then a type of experience is
type-veridical.
E) If
it is reasonable to believe that a type of experience is not type-veridical,
then it is also reasonable to believe that no token of that type is
token-veridical.
F) It
is not reasonable to believe that no token of that type is token-veridical,
i.e., all token experiences are totally delusory.
G)
Hence it is not reasonable to believe that the type of experience is not
type-veridical.
I
suggest this argument can work for TE. The crucial premise, of course, is (F). It
seems to me and some others, e.g., Gutting, that (F) has strong intuitive
appeal. Although it may be hard to produce a formal argument for (F), it is
nonetheless compelling after we have surveyed all the relevant evidence.
It is not necessarily dependent on demonstration of token-veridicality of a
particular TE. Yet when we ponder the numerous TEs, their enormous effects
sometimes, the honesty of the witnesses, the depth dimension of life and so on,
it seems hard to believe that all of them are delusory. Moreover, we may
also encounter the life story of a person who has dramatic experiences of God
throughout his life. We also find that the person is honest, sane, wise and
intelligent, and his story corroborated by many others' stories throughout
history in many countries. Isn't it rash to say that all of them are
entirely and chronically deluded? Ordinary
people may also find it hard to produce an explicit and water-tight argument
for his belief that the earth is round rather than flat. Yet we won't deny that
their intuitive judgment, which is based on many empirical clues, is rational.
Can't we also claim that some ordinary believers in God, which have access to
the relevant experiential evidence for God, can be rational in judging that (F)
is true?
Nevertheless,
it would be nice if we can put forward a philosophical argument to back up the
intuitive judgment. (F), when applied to TE, is roughly equivalent to "it
is not unreasonable to believe that at least one token TE is veridical." This is exactly the conclusion I am trying to
defend via the CTA. I will suggest and defend the criteria for judging when a
token TE is veridical. Of course, we can then point to a particular TE and
argue for it. However, I would prefer another strategy: let us point to a collection
of TEs and suggest that it is reasonable to believe that at least one of them
is veridical. I would choose this subset of TE: experiences of the presence of
God. Firstly, the claim of this TE is more modest and it is not liable to be in
serious conflict with many TEs or non-TEs. Secondly, it is quite widely shared
cross-culturally and across the epochs. Many spontaneous experiences of
non-believers are also similar to this sense of presence of God. (Hay) Thirdly, these TEs usually occur spontaneously
in very diverse situations to many different kinds of people which are not in
abnormal psychological or physiological conditions. This would make the
naturalistic explanation of all these quite difficult. So it seems to me this
sub-type of TE is least problematic and it is easier to argue that it is
undefeated. My conclusion is that (B) is false: even if we cannot pinpoint one
particular token as veridical, we can still argue that some token or other
can be reasonably judged to be veridical and hence the experience is
type-veridical. There is no intrinsic connection between having precise CV and
the justifiability of a type of experience.
My
strategy can have a parallel in SE. Some argue for the veridicality of SE by
the Paradigm Case Argument. The idea is that when we decide the veridicality of
a type of experience, we should not focus on the most problematic tokens, e.g.,
the optical illusions. Instead we should concentrate on the least problematic
tokens, i.e., the paradigm cases. However, it seems to me this move is best
construed as pointing to a subset of SE which is regarded as paradigmatic and
then arguing that at least one token of this is veridical. It is not so wise to
stake the argument on a particular SE. Moore has once given this example
of his certain beliefs: there were windows behind the curtains in the hall
where he was lecturing. It turned out to be false. What is mistaken here is not
exactly a SE but I hope the idea is clear. If we point to a particular table in
front of us, isn't it genuinely possible that later on a much more convincing
sequence of SEs would disconfirm that?
For example, later experiences of similarly 'high quality' may suggest
to one that the table was only dreamt of. However, this sort of possibility
wouldn't disprove the claim that at least one of these 'high quality' SEs is
veridical.
Criteria
of Veridicality of Sense Experience and the Critical Trust Approach
Let
us explore further the question how we can determine and justify some CV in the
first place. The purpose is to show that the CTA provides a plausible way to
explain the whence of our CV even in the case of SE. Moreover, this approach
does not short-circuit the crucial justificatory procedures of cross-checking,
as Fales accuses, but in fact makes those justificatory procedures possible in
the first place and gives them an important role to play afterwards.
Let me first provide the overall view of
the Critical Trust Approach:
1) Data Gleaning- Trust:
The data for the CTA are all our
experiences, which are defeasible. They only have presumptive weight- let us
call them presumptive data.
2) Data Sifting and Epistemic Ascent- Critical
Trust:
a) Ground level sifting
The presumptive data can be defeated by
reasons which show their unreliability. Typically the defeater itself is
defeasible and there can be a defeater-defeater. Again the defeater-defeater is
defeasible and there can be defeater-defeater-defeater and so on. So we have to
bring in coherence considerations to determine the weight of each presumptive
datum. Once a presumptive datum coheres with many other presumptive data, its
weight would be increased and it can serve to defeat another less weighty
presumptive datum. A presumptive datum which conflicts with many other
presumptive datum is then defeated. In general, we can formulate this
methodological rule:
The Rule of Ground Level Sifting
Always choose the
consistent subset of our presumptive data which has maximal weight.
b) Explanatory Ascent and Feedback Sifting
The data of experience (of various kinds)
need to be ordered, explained and made more intelligible. So the data of sense
experience, when subjected to the search for order and intelligibility, yield
the scientific framework. However, the framework itself can have feedback
effect on the initial data. Some presumptive data of sense experience may be
rejected due to theoretical reasons. Swinburne proposes the Principle of
Simplicity here. His strategy is that a prima facie justified belief is
successfully defeated when it is in conflict with the simplest theory
compatible with a vast number of data obtained by supposing in a vast number of
other cases that things are as they seem to be. In general, when the
presumptive data conflict and the best explanation cannot comprehend all the
data, our best explanatory theory can serve as defeater of those 'recalcitrant'
data.
c) Second Order Critical Principle
When we trust the majority of our
presumptive data, those data may suggest to us that some types of presumptive
data are not altogether reliable. For example, those presumptive data are found
to be grossly inconsistent or they are contradicted by other well-established
data. In such cases, we can formulate second order critical principles. These
principles are critical because they tell us under some circumstances
certain presumptive data are better doubted than trusted. They are second
order principles because the justification of these principles depend on
our basic trust of our presumptive data which is prescribed by the first order
Principle of Critical Trust.
d) Consensus and Testimony
Our data consist of personal experiences as
well as testimonies. The Principle of Testimony dictates that others'
testimonies are also presumptive data for one. Hence consensus does have a part
to play:
Principle of Consensus:
3) Cognitive Adjustment:
When a prima facie justified belief is
defeated, what kind of cognitive adjustment should we make to our original
cognitive structure? All other things
being equal, if we accord prima facie justification to our original
experience, we should reinterpret the original experience so as to preserve as
much truth in the original experience as possible:
Principle of Conservation:
When an experience
is defeated, it is rational to salvage as much noetic content as possible from
that epistemic seeming, i.e., to retain the highest undefeated level of
epistemic seeming embedded in that experience.
Now
let us go back to the problem of the whence of CV in SE. Consider these two
statements:
1) We
possess some criteria of veridicality.
2) We
can identify tokens of veridical experiences.
Which
is logically prior, (1) or (2)? Neither option seems palatable. If we don't
know how to identify tokens of veridical experiences, it is hard to see how we
can arrive at some CV. But if we don't have some CV and our experiences are
fallible, how can we identify tokens of veridical experience?
Suppose
(1) is logically prior. Obviously we are faced with the problem how we arrive
at those CV. Nobody would suggest that they are revealed by God or some angels.
Perhaps the relevant criteria are conceptually derived from the ontology of
physical objects in space-time. Gale seems to adopt a similar line. He argues
that all the relevant tests can be derived from the nature of physical
objects and space-time. Now let us take Gale's understanding of the nature of
physical objects as given and explore his position. Can the tests solve
the sceptical problem? According to him,
from the nature of the physical objects, we can derive these results: if a SE
is veridical, then we can predict future SEs of the subject and others and the
subject's sensory faculty is in good working order and he is in the proper
spatio-temporal position to perceive the apparent object of the SE and so on.
(He gives 11 tests altogether.) Suppose
these criteria are formulated:
CVp
If
the prediction is borne out and the man is in the proper position and so on,
then the SE is probably veridical.
CVn
If
the prediction is not borne out or the man is not in the proper position or
..., then the SE is probably unveridical.
Now
the same problem afflicts him: we cannot ascertain whether the CV are satisfied
apart from some basic trust in SE. Moreover, CVn seems to be more secure since they follow from
the above theory about physical objects. It is otherwise for CVp. If we are
just given the theory about the physical objects and not their existence,
then the satisfaction can be explained by the sceptics as well. The theory need
not be about some actually existing things: it can be in the mind of the evil
scientist instead. Perhaps the evil scientist is also a good philosopher: he
first lays down some ontological descriptions of the nature of 'physical objects'
and then derives the principles which govern the 'veridicality' or
'unveridicality' of SEs. These principles are then used as the most basic
axioms of his program which governs the inputs to a brain-in-a-vat. (Of course
he also needs to draft some contingent causal laws which conform to the
axioms.) In this way all the experiences
of the brain-in-a-vat would indeed conform to Gale's theory of SE. Perhaps the
brain-in-a-vat also reasons as Gale does and concludes that all his experiences
must be real?! So Gale's tests are not an adequate reply to scepticism.
However, his discussion certainly shows further the coherence of SE. It is
because the tests need not be passed by our experiences and the fact that they
are frequently passed is impressive. The result is that if the basic trust
in our SE is justified, then unveridical SEs are indeed much easier to weed
out. This would increase the internal coherence of SE.
Now I
have to raise the question: how Gale's understanding of physical objects is
derived from the first place? Perhaps we
can rely on the grasp of some a priori necessary truths.[10] But they do not seem to be sufficient to
sustain such a detailed theory like Gale's. For example, Gale assumes that
physical objects have a sort of stability and universal accessibility to
persons. I don't think it is an a priori truth. To establish this our experiences
themselves are also indispensable. Without prior trust in those experiences,
can we trust the theory derived from them? All these questions push us to take
seriously the case that (2) is prior to (1). We have a priori principles which
justify our basic prima facie trust in our SEs. The veridical tokens are then
established by the ground level sifting. Only after that we can investigate the
perceptual conditions of veridical SE and the nature of the physical objects.
Of course, this knowledge would help us lay down our criteria of veridicality.
The process is ongoing and further knowledge may help us to modify, revise or
add to our previous CV.
If it
is the correct picture, then we shouldn't expect the same CV would apply to
different sorts of experience. Take interpersonal experience as an example. How
is the consensus test to be applied here?
Chesterton has an example roughly like this. Suppose we are told that a
young lady calls his fiancee by a very intimate nickname. Are we going to test
it by summoning fifteen psychologists to observe their interaction and
conversation? Similarly, when A tells us
that B told him a very traumatic experience, we would not insist that B has to
tell the same experience before all of us!
It is because by the very nature of the case, these experiences,
if veridical, are not likely to be publicly corroborated. So it seems to me,
the following principle should be kept in mind when we decide the CV for a type
of experience:
The
CV for a type of experience should be appropriate to the nature of the alleged
object of experience and the subject of experience.
This
principle is all along operating even in SE. We tend to forget that there are
many kinds of physical objects and perceivers as well. The way to test the existence
of wind would be very different from that of a table, not to mention atoms, EM
fields, etc. We won't apply the test of touch to a far away flying object. We
won't insist that a table has to be seen by a blind man. All these illustrate
the fact that our actual tests and cross-checking of a particular SE are
actually context-dependent, i.e., depending on the whole perceptual context
which is constituted by the subject, the object and the environment. Any change
of this context would affect our decision as to which tests are relevant. It is
a false picture to suggest that we have fixed, uniform tests even in SE.
Let
us look at some concrete example. We seem to see a bending stick when part of a
straight stick is immersed in water. We would count that as an illusion while
taking the perception of the straight stick as veridical. This distinction is
taught to us since our early days and most of us would take it for granted. But
can we give an account of the reasons for this move? Let us not first take into consideration the
science of optics. If the optical account of the illusion is necessary for the
above distinction, then we are denying the right of most of our ancestors to
make this distinction. This seems most implausible. If we just consider the more
common sense response, then probably the reason why the apparent perception of
a bent stick is illusory is as follows: "If we take the stick out of the
water, the stick again looks straight. Furthermore, if we grope for the stick
partly immersed in water, it still feels straight. Therefore it must remain
straight although it seems to be bent."
However, this reasoning can be doubted. For the first reason to be
conclusive, it has to make two more assumptions: firstly, the visual
perceptions are veridical; secondly, the shape of the stick has remained
constant throughout the process. If we are prepared to grant that the stick is
bent when it is partly immersed in water and it is straight when
all of it is out of the water, then we can insist that both perceptions of a
straight stick and a bent one are veridical. As for the tactual experience of
straightness, why can't we insist that vision is more reliable than tactual
experience and take the tactual experience as illusory instead of the visual
one? To settle the question in favour of
the common way of interpretation we seem to need two rational principles:
Other
things being equal, we should choose an interpretation of experience which fits
with the simpler ontology.
Other
things being equal, we should choose an interpretation of experience which
would render more of our perceptual experiences veridical.
The second principle in itself is not
sufficient: both interpretations would need to render some experience illusory
and it does not decidedly favor the common sense interpretation. However, the
common sense interpretation posits a sort of stick which would not suddenly
change shape when immersed in water and this ontology is simpler. Someone may
object that a stick is just not the type of object that would easily change
shape. This piece of knowledge, it might be argued, is the foundation of our
common sense interpretation of experience rather than my alleged rational
principles. This reply won't do. It may seem obvious to us that the above
statement about the stick is true but it is only so because it is repeatedly
confirmed in our experiences. But given that our experiences can be illusory,
can we decide what is confirmed by our conflicting experiences unless we
have a way to distinguish which experiences should be counted as veridical and
which illusory? The answer seems to be no. Similar questions can be raised
about our knowledge of the causal powers of various things, which Fales has
presupposed in his account of cross-checking. But apart from a basic trust in
SE, how can we know there really are things like causes and effects, and how do
we determine what kinds of causal relationship exist? All these only make sense
when a CTA has been assumed.
If
so, then the above principles seem to be basic principles of
experiential interpretation in accordance with which we posit the
veridical-illusory distinction. The first one is effectively a form of the
Principle of Simplicity. The second is a variant of my Rule of Ground Level
Sifting which is a corollary of the PCT. In other words, adoption of this
principle already commits us to a basic prima facie trust in our experiences.
If so, then my CTA can nicely account for the way we make the
veridical-illusory distinction.
Similar
arguments are possible for other CV. For example the consensus test is
effectively the employment of the Principle of Consensus which is a corollary
of the CTA. As for the test by scientific equipment, it seems to be a case of
my feedback sifting. I agree that consideration of ontology comes in when we
make the veridical-illusory distinction but this distinction is still prior to
the knowledge of the nature of the physical world. To gain such
knowledge we need to justify it by veridical experiences and hence
before we can know which claims can be regarded as knowledge we need to decide
which experiences are veridical. My idea is that our knowledge of the nature of
the physical world is justificatorily dependent on the application of PCT to
SE. Of course when it has been built up, it can be used to do feedback sifting
and to formulate more precise CV. In SE, the ontology of the physical objects
is believed to be correctly described by our scientific theories and that is
why science can play a crucial role in confirming (or disconfirming) our common
sense way of making the veridical-illusory distinction. I have earlier raised
the question why, in the case of the apparently bending stick, the visual
experience is taken to be illusory rather than the tactual experience of it.
One powerful reason for this is provided by the theory of geometrical optics
because it gives a more detailed explanation of the visual illusion by positing
the process of refraction of light rays by water. On the other hand, if we take
the interpretation that the stick is bent when partly immersed in water, we do
not have explanations why the bending occurs and how the alleged tactual
illusion of straightness occurs. (However I take this to be a contingent
matter. Perhaps such explanations are not available because they have never
been sought: we have already decided that the bending is not probable. It does
not mean however that it is not possible that the immersion in water would
cause the bending of the stick. It just isn't the case and this is confirmed by
the scientific explanations.) So another
principle seems to be involved:
If
two interpretations of experience both render some experiences illusory, the
interpretation which gives better explanations of the alleged illusions is to
be preferred.
This
seems to be another example of feedback sifting by inference to the best
explanation.
My
conclusion is that a plausible account of the 'whence' of our criteria of SE
actually fits quite well with my CTA[11].
This process of deriving the CV can be summarized:
1)
Basic prima facie trust in our experiences.
2) By
explanatory ascent and data sifting, we decide which types of token are more
reliable and which unreliable. At this level, some preliminary CV would emerge.
The CVp are basically derived by observing which
tokens exhibit higher degree of coherence with the majority of other token
experiences of oneself and others. The CVn are derived by observing which type of tokens
conflict with the more established ones. (CVn are Second Order Critical Principles.)
Investigation of perceptual conditions would help both.
3) It
is possible that by further explanatory ascent, we can have a more detailed theory
about the object of experience. This theory is then used to confirm, modify or
revise our preliminary CV in such a way to gain overall coherence. More precise
CV may then result.
So
far I have argued that the lack of precise ascertainable criteria does not tend
to make a type of experience unjustifiable or unreliable. Nor can it render the
PCT inapplicable. So why the critics think it is so damaging? I suggest in the end such objections may only
betray the bias that all experiences should be checkable by criteria similar to
those used in sensory perception. So it is the disanalogy with SE that is seen
to be damaging.[12]
But why should we assume all basic sources of justification have to resemble
SE? This seems to be epistemic imperialism, as Alston says.
Tests
for TE
In
order to give a fuller reply to the No Crosschecking Objection, let us discuss
the CV for TE and their justifiability. First, consider Jantzen's suggestion:
"It is characteristic of religious experiences that they have qualities of
intensity and great significance- so much so that typically it is felt that the
experience challenges and questions the mystic to his very core, that he would
be betraying his own integrity and stultifying the possibilities of his own
growth if he did not take it seriously. The reciprocal questioning and
deepening of understanding which then occurs contributes to the process in
which self-integration and wholeness, including deeper sensitivity to the needs
and suffering of others, can develop in a quality of life lived in conscious
relationship to a compassionate God. Seen in this way, it makes sense of the
relationship between specific experiences and the experienced quality of life,
and indeed makes that life a continual testing of those experiences- and
they of it" (Jantzen, 289; italics mine) So can a mystical experience legitimately tip
the balance in favour of belief in a personal God? "Well, no: not if it is a one-off odd
ecstasy without bearing on the whole of life lived. But what it can
legitimately do is be part of a process of deepening understanding of oneself
and others, part of which is bound sooner or later to bring about the
recognition that self-transformation is in one sense necessary and in another
impossible: more resources are needed than our own. ... as RE deepens into a
quality of life lived in integrity, the reciprocity of encounter and response
can legitimately tip the balance: it is rational for the mystic to believe in a
personal God" (Jantzen, 290). Because "this reciprocity ... is part
of the basic pattern of rationality, in which questioning occurs from within a
perspective, but in which the answers obtained by that questioning can in turn
modify that perspective, sometimes radically, leading to deepening
understanding and thus to a new round of questioning" (Jantzen, 289).
However Jantzen thinks it need not be irrational for one who does not himself experience
a personal God to hold to a atheistic view.
Though
I disagree with Jantzen's conservative estimate of the evidential force of REs,
she still draws us to an important point: a TE does not just occur, at least
for some, out of the blue and then disappears without a trace. It shapes a life
and it has a dimension of depth that conveys a sense of reality that, at least
for those who experience it, is hard to deny. Of course, I am not proposing
here that this proves the veridicality of REs. It is doubtful we can
ever prove the veridicality of a single experience. I am only saying we have no
reason to expect the criteria of TEs should conform to the pattern of the
criteria of sensory experiences[13].
If we drop this unreasonable expectation and look at the religious case, is it
not clear that the tests we can reasonably expect are somewhat like the
reciprocity tests described by Jantzen?
Another author, Henderson, also claims to find similar ideas in Austin
Farrer: "Farrer insists that verifying evidence cannot consist in certain
predilineated events which we observe. For God is unique; he makes an
unconditional claim upon our devotion. To make him prove his existence through
the production of happy effects would be to subvert the affirmation; it would
be a subordination of God's will to ours rather than of ours to God's. ... The
affirmation of God, if genuine, is a practical affirmation which runs into the
activity of integrating one's own will with God's. ... through the affirmation
of God we become participants in a life which surpasses also the life in
community with ordinary persons. ... We verify the affirmation of God's existence,
therefore, by entering into life-in-God and finding that the life can indeed be
lived and lived in all circumstances and that it blesses" (Henderson,
178-79). This blessing is the "blessing of a union of will with the primal
will" which is also "the fundamental blessing of finding oneself
where one belongs".
Let
me spell out more clearly my suggestion:
CVp(TE)
A
TE of a person S is more likely[14]
to be veridical if:
a)
S has more TEs later in life; the probative force is stronger if these
confirming TEs are more frequent and more various.
b)
the original experience and the subsequent ones exhibit a high degree of
coherence with the original experience. Reciprocity is a kind of consilience:
the original experience and the subsequent ones lead to a continuous process of
questioning and deeper understanding and further questioning and so on. The
original object of TE seems to have inexhaustible richness that eludes one's
expectations.
c)
a substantial amount of people also have similar experiences. (The more the
better.) It is even better that the
experience is shared at the same time, e.g. a corporate TE.
d)
the experience is coherent, congruent or consilient with other experiences,
e.g. moral or existential experiences.
e)
the experience leads him on the road to self-integration, e.g. he understands
himself better, leads a more fulfilling life.
f)
the experience helps him to lead a morally better life, e.g. higher sensitivity
to others, more loving, better moral insights, humility.
g)
the experience produces a strong sense of reality which is not clearly induced
by abnormal conditions or psychological processes.
h)
the experience is accompanied by 'happy effects', coincidences, or miracles
which are hard to explain naturalistically.
Normally,
it would be objected that these tests draw on the theistic traditions'
understanding of God. But I hope I have already shown that this procedure is
not illegitimate. Actually in establishing the CV for any type of experience we
have to follow this pattern. So let me instead explain further why these
criteria hold. They seem to follow more or less straightforwardly from the
categoreal nature of the object of experience, i.e., God in this case. If the
experience is veridical and God exists, it seems likely that God will reveal to
S further, if S is open to that. Since God can manifest in many ways, it seems
more true of God's nature if S's experience is confirmed by different
modalities of TE. So (a) is plausible. (b) follows from the general
probative force of coherence between initially probative experiences. If God is
independent and transcendent and the original experience is not self-generated,
then further experiences should reveal unexpected, surprising characteristics
of God and the object should appear to be unfathomable by experiences. (c)
follows from the Principle of Consensus. If God is the source of all veridical
experiences, a veridical experience should also be coherent with other
veridical experiences. I am prepared to argue that moral experience and
existential experiences should not be dismissed and they can plausibly be
argued to come from God as well. If so, (d) ensues. If God's approach to man is
meant to give his life meaning and wholeness and if God Himself is man's telos,
a TE which achieves this is more probably veridical, hence (e). If God is also
the source of community and values, then contact with him is likely to produce
moral transformation, hence (f). If God is the Ultimate Reality and he can more
directly act on the soul, then it is expected that genuine experience of God
should have a strong sense of reality. (g) is not surprising at all. If God is
the Creator, he can also perform providential acts in order to confirm his
purpose, hence (h).
Now
one crucial point is that the above are positive CV. (Note there is only
a 'if'- not 'only if'.) We cannot argue
that if either one of the above is lacking, then the original experience is
likely to be unveridical. This is not an ad hoc move. In general I deny that CVp and CVn have to be symmetrical. More positively, the
asymmetry in this case is due to the fact of freedom of God and man. God may
not choose to use providential acts to confirm his purpose, hence (h) can't be
used as a CVn.
Similarly, a man can resist further contacts with God and he may even
deliberately run away from God after the first encounter. Hence (a) to (f)
can't be used as CVn. However, as believers himself realize the fallibility of TEs,
the lack of (a) to (h) does lessen his confidence in that particular TE. The
following principle seems true:
If
a large number of conditions from (a) to (h) are not satisfied, then although
the TE is not thereby regarded as unveridical, it will be treated with some
reserve.
CVn(TE)
A
TE of S is likely to be unveridical if:
a)
it conflicts with the well-established TEs (by the above criteria).
b)
it conflicts with other well-established experiences, especially moral
experience.
c)
it leads to a disintegrated life, e.g. insanity.
d)
it conflicts with well-established knowledge.
My
conclusion is that we can justify and specify some CV for TE. (cf. Alston's
test of sanctification) The circularity
is not damaging if the CTA is true and anyway CV for SE is similarly circular.
So Fales’ objection that the CV of TE are epistemically irrelevant does not hold
water.[15]
He is often just reasserting
his standard (NCO1) and insists on applying it to TE, without giving a proper
response to Alston’s reply. I have argued in this paper that NCO1 is false, and
the CTA gives a better picture of our epistemic situation. So Fales’ No
Cross-checking Objection fails, and Alston’s TA emerges unscathed.
However,
it should be conceded that the CV for TE are much vaguer than those in SE. The
CV for SE, in some situations, can be quite precise and their
applicability often produces a bootstrap which further increase its internal
coherence. Cross-checking does have some epistemic significance. This is also a
significant disanalogy between SE and TE. So after all there is something in Fales’ objection but
he has drawn the wrong conclusion. The correct conclusion to draw is
not that the TA has been defeated but that SE is more reliable than TE.
In no way it follows that TE as a whole is type-unreliable or unjustified.
Reference
Alston, William. 1977. "Can Psychology
Do Without Private Data?" In John
M. Nicholas, ed., Images, Perception
and Knowledge (Dordrecht: D. Reidl Publishing Co).
Alston, William. 1991. Perceiving God:
The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press.
Alston, William. 2004. “Religious
Experience Justifies Religious Belief” and “Reply to Fales.” In Contemporary
Debates in Philosophy of Religion, ed. by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond
J. VanArragon (Oxford, Blackwell), pp. 135-145, 158-161.
Armstrong, D.M. and Malcolm, Norman. 1984. Consciousness
and Causality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Audi, Robert. 1988. Belief,
Justification and Knowledge. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Ayer, A.J. 1977. "The Causal Theory of
Perception." PAS Supplementary Vol. 1977.
Fales, Evan. 1990. Causation and
Universals. London: Routledge.
Fales, Evan. 2004. “Do Mystics See God?”
and “Reply to Alston.” In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion,
ed. by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (Oxford, Blackwell), pp.
145-158, 161-163.
Gale, Richard. 1991. On the Nature and
Existence of God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gellman, Jerome. 2001. Mystical
Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Gutting, Gary. 1982. Religious Belief
and Religious Skepticism. University of Notre Dame Press.
Hay, David. 1990. Religious Experience
Today. London: Mowbray.
Henderson, Edward Hugh. 1985. "Valuing
in Knowing God: an Interpretation of Austin Farrer's Religious
Epistemology." Modern Theology 1:3, pp.165-82.
Jantzen, Grace. 1987. "Epistemology,
Religious Experience, and Religious Belief." Modern Theology
3:277-291.
Kwan, Kai-man. 2003. “Is the Critical Trust
Approach to Religious Experience Incompatible with Religious Particularism? A
Reply to Michael Martin and John Hick,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 20
no.2 (April 2003), pp. 152-169.
Losin, Peter. 1987. "Experience of God
and the Principle of Credulity: a Reply to Rowe." Faith and Philosophy 4:59-70.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. Warrant and
Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rowe, William. 1982. "Religious
Experience and the Principle of Credulity." International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 13:85-92.
Slote, Michael. 1970. Reason and
Scepticism. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
Wainwright, William. 1973. "Natural
Explanations and Religious Experience". Ratio 15:98-101.
Wainwright, William. 1981. Mysticism. Brighton:
The Harvester Press.
[2] William Alston, Perceiving
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1991).
[3] For example, Matthew
Bagger has repeatedly accused Alston of adopting a protective strategy which
shields religious experiences from critical scrutiny. See his Religious
Experience, Justification, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), passim.
[4] John Hick, "The
Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism," Faith and Philosophy
14 (1997), p. 277.
[5] In fact many of the basic points have already been stated by Alston
(2004), and I think he has successfully defended himself against Fales.
However, their exchange raises a lot of crucial questions which need to be
explored more thoroughly.
[6] Fales does not
exactly talk in the language of justification. He uses the language of evidence
most of the time. However, the two kinds of language are more or less
inter-convertible. A kind of experience is prima facie justified if and only if
it can be used as prima facie evidence.
[7] Fales does not
explicitly formulate his objection in this way but the argument is clearly
contained in this passage: “cross-checking…is a mandatory feature of any
recruitment of perceptual experience to epistemic ends; and that, therefore, it
is a requirement that must be met in theistic appeals to mystical experience as
evidence for theism. …this requirement has not, and probably cannot, be met. So
… mystical experience provides hardly any useful support for theism” (Fales
2004, 147).
[8] Or “the centrality of
cross-checking…is demanded for knowledge of any causal process, in which causes
are known via their effects. …in connection with any claim to have perceptual
access to an extra-mental reality” (Fales 2004, 149).
[9] Note that this principle does not entail that when an experience is
not, or even cannot be, consensually corroborated, it should then be doubted.
[10] Gale indeed appeals
to some necessary truths but it is not clear how he understands the nature of
such necessary truths.
[12] Fales does not explicitly assert this statement but many of his
arguments only make good sense under this assumption.
[13] cf. Alston: "it
is an unthinking parochialism or chauvinism, or epistemic imperialism ... to
suppose the CMP (christian mystical practice) is properly assessed in terms of
the checks and tests appropriate to SP (sensory practice). Judging CMP outputs
on the basis of SP tests is no more appropriate than evaluating introspective,
memory, or mathematical beliefs by the same tests. The objection to CMP I have
been considering is guilty of the same kind of chauvinism as Plato's and
Descartes's low assessment of SP as lacking the precision, stability, and
certainty of mathematics and Hume's low assessment of inductive reasoning as
lacking the conclusiveness of deductive reasoning. ... I have been stressing
the irreducible plurality of doxastic practices in the tradition of Reid and
Wittgenstein" (Alston 1991, 220)
However, I also emphasize that a general scheme like the CTA seems
applicable.
[14] Remember the CVp are not meant to prove. They are
formulated on the assumption of the PCT. It is possible that all the criteria
are satisfied and the theistic experience still unveridical. The same goes for
the CV in sense experience as well.
[15] Many of Fales’ specific criticisms are dubious. For example, is it
really true that the attainment of inner peace or the approval of spiritual
advisors can be easily controlled by oneself? Lack of space does not permit me
to give detailed replies.
