Abbreviations
SB=Swinburne SE=sense experience
RE=religious
experience TE=theistic experience
In his book The Existence of God,
Richard Swinburne presents an argument from RE which utilizes an
epistemological principle which is dubbed the Principle of Credulity:
(PC) If it
seems to me that x is present, then it is rational to believe that x is present
unless there are special considerations to the contrary.
SB argues that it is a fundamental
principle of rationality apart from which we cannot provide any noncircular
justification of either ordinary perception or memory. Then using this principle, SB formulates the
following argument for the existence of God:
A) It seems to me that God is present.
B) There is no good reason to think either
God is non-existent or not present.
C) Hence it is rational (at least for me)
to believe that God is present.
In
his book On the Nature & Existence of God, Richard Gale spent a long
chapter on the argument from RE (chapter 8) & offered criticisms of
versions of this argument which are defended by Wainwright, Gutting, Alston
& SB. In this essay I intend to look
at Gale's discussions in some details & try to respond to him.
R. GALE'S CRITICISMS OF THE ARGUMENT FROM
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Gale declares that his concern is with
"nonsensory experiences that their subjects take to be "direct"
or noninferential experiences of God, the eternal one, & the like. ... those that are taken by their subjects
to be of some objective reality that transcends consciousness & exists
independently of being experienced."(p.286) He believes that for these experiences to
have "evidential status, these experiences must not only be veridical but
cognitive as well. ... It could qualify as veridical in virtue of the apparent
object of the experience causing the experience in the "right way,"
but not count as cognitive since it does not constitute evidence or warrant for
believing that this object exists & is as it appears to be in the
experience. ... A cognitive faculty should stand on its own two epistemological
feet. ... REs, although possibly
veridical, could not be cognitive. Even
if it were possible that their apparent object exist & be the right sort of
cause of the experience, we could never know on the basis of these experiences
either that this object exists or that the experience is caused in the
"right way" by it. ... a RE also could not qualify as a veridical
perception of an objective reality, even if its apparent object were to exist
& be the cause of the experience."(p.287) The reasons for these claims are then
elaborated.
Gale
believes that "If a type of experience E is cognitive, then the
occurrence of an E-type experience counts as evidence for the existence
of its intentional accusative, even for those who have not had this
experience or even any E-type experiences."(p.287) The reason is: "That a cognitive experience's evidential status is not
person-relative is a fundamental conceptual requirement for an experience
having cognitive status". It means
that Gale believes that if REs are to have evidential status for some people,
they would also be evidence for all.
Gale further says that "Every argument (for the cognitivity of REs)
that I know is based on an analogy with SE" (p.288) whose general form is:
1.
REs are analogous to SEs;
2.
SEs are cognitive; therefore,
3.
REs are cognitive.
His
general verdict on this kind of argument is 'failure' because he thinks that
"the various analogies are very thin & that the disanalogies are very
extensive & deep, thereby destroying the different versions of the
analogical argument." He also
thinks that "The fate of all these nonsensory faculties of
"perception" (e.g. intellectual intuition, moral intuition) are
intertwined such that if my polemic vs the cognitivity of RE succeeds, it works
equally well mutatis mutandis these other nonsensory "perceptual"
faculties." (p.290) He discusses
three forms of this analogical argument (AA) which differ in strength of the
analogy with SE asserted.
Weak Form: LG Fideism
This form of AA points out that "both (SE &
RE) serve as the basis on which objective existential claims are made within
different ongoing language games, such a game being a normatively rule-governed
human practice of using language." (p.291)
"A language game is individuated by the part of its ontology- what
it is about or refers to- that has its categoreal nature defined by the rules
of the game. Each language game has
epistemological autonomy in that it has its own principles of rationality &
justification, especially in regard to the unique part of its ontology. Language games can overlap in their ontologies,
categories, & epistemology. Whether
a type of experience counts as cognitive is relative to a language
game."(p.292)
An
of-O-type experience- an experience that has O as its apparent object or
intentional accusative- counts as cognitive relative to language game L just in
case:
(a) The vast majority of the L-players upon
having an of-O-type experience assert or believe that they are having an
experience of an objectively existent O or that there exists an objective O
& agree that it is correct to do so; &
(b) L contains a noninductively derived
rule of presumptive inference that if one has an of-O-type experience, then one
probably has an experience of an objective O or there exists an objective O.
Gale's
major criticism of this form is that the analogy of this language game with SE
is too thin: "whereas the existential claims based upon SE have only a
prima facie warrant, since subject to a battery of interconnected tests &
checks, there are no defeating conditions for existential claims based upon RE
... (therefore) there is no basis for drawing the distinction ./. his actually
perceiving God & it just seeming to him as if he is perceiving
God."(p.294) Hence the
veridical-unveridical distinction does not hold in this language game &
this disanalogy with SE is fatal to the argument. He also points out that this is not the
actual religious language game which allows for the possibility of error.
LG Fideism with any Old Tests
In this form of AA, the further analogy drawn upon is
that "in both games there are checks & tests or defeating conditions
for these games"(p.291).
Furthermore the argument asserts "considerable epistemological
autonomy to these games, each having its own distinctive criteria of
rationality & epistemic justification". However,
Gale thought it is wrong because "This game is part of the larger
religious language game, which employs many of the same principles of deductive
& inductive logic as does the sensory-based physical object language";
for the "intellectually sophisticated adults", "God exists"
is not basic because "they are willing to give various sorts of epistemic
justifications for it."(p.296)
"There is only one big language game of which different so-called
language games are interconnected parts.
The RE language game ... is part & parcel of the physical world
one"(p.296) Another objection of
Gale is that this argument justifies far too much! He asks us to consider a RE language game
"in which the only test or check is based upon what the cult leader
says."(p.297) He thinks though it
is logically possible that this language game is not falsified by other
factors, yet it is still obvious that this language game is not cognitive.
LG Fideism with Analogous Tests
The third form of AA asserts further that both SE
& RE have similar tests for veridical experiences. Alston, Gutting, SB, & Wainwright are listed as defenders of this
argument. "All 4 begin with an a
priori presumptive inference rule, subject to defeating conditions, linking how
things perceptually seem with how they really are that applies to SEs &
then argue by analogy that it should also hold for REs. The rule must be a priori because in both
cases any attempt to justify its adoption or establish the reliability of the
doxastic practice of making existential claims on the basis of the type of
experience in question will suffer from vicious circularity. ... If we are
willing to accept a circular justification in one case so as to escape
scepticism, we should be willing to do so in the other. It would not only violate the principle of
parity but also be an unwarranted display of chauvinism for us to demand that
the reliability of the RE doxastic practice be established by appeal to
SE."(pp.298-9) "That the two doxastic practices of
belief formation are to be accorded parity is justified by showing that they
are analogous in cognitively relevant aspects, especially in regard to both
containing their own checks & tests." (p.299) In
order to evaluate the above argument, Gale lists eleven tests of SE:
"1. Logical consistency.
Are the sensory-based claims of the subject logically consistent?
2. Empirical
consistency. Are they consistent
with well-established empirical facts?
3. Existence
of apparent object. Are there good
arguments either for or against the existence of the apparent object of the SE?
4. Reliability
of subject. Does the subject have a
good track record in his past perceptual claims?
5. Agreement. Do the SEs had by others under normal or
standard conditions agree with the subject's?
6. Continuity
./. contents. Does the content of
the experience stand in the right sort of lawlike relations to those of the
vast majority of the subject's preceding & succeeding experiences?
7. Prediction. Can future SEs of the subject & others be
predicted on the basis of the assumption that the experience is veridical?
8. Proper
position. Was the subject properly
located in space & time so as to have been able to perceive the apparent
object of his SEs?
9. Physiological
state of subject. Was the subject's
sensory faculty in good working order?
10.
Psychological state of subject.
Did the subject have any psychological impediments to his being able to
perceive adequately, for instance, phobias, prejudices, or the like?
11.
Causal requirement. Did the
apparent object cause the experiences in the right way?
The
analogical arguer takes these tests to form a "cluster" in that no
one of them is either necessary or sufficient for veridicality, but
satisfaction of a sufficient number is such." (pp.302-3)
After
listing these tests, Gale then proceeds to argue that the tests of RE are
actually gravely disanalogous with the above tests for SE. Tests 1-3 are applicable but they only
specify the bare minimum & passing them does not make any positive case for
the cognitivity of the type of experience.
(Though he doubts that mystical experience would pass tests 1-3.) Test 4 is basically parasitic on other
tests. So he starts to discuss from test
5 onwards.
On
test 5: agreement. "The agreement
or disagreement of other observers is relevant only if their observations are
made under so-called normal or standard conditions. We have a pretty good idea of what they are
for SE. Their mystical or religious
analogues vary from one mystical or religious tradition to another but usually
involve asceticism, meditation, breathing exercises, & the
like."(p.307) But "mystics (i)
count as confirmatory mystical experiences that occur without following the
prescribed "mystical way" & (ii) do not count failure to have a
mystical experience under the prescribed conditions as
disconfirmatory." Naturally, Gale's
complaint is that it looks like a "heads I win, tails you lose" sort
of con game.
On
tests 8-10. Furthermore "since the notion of a normal observer
& normal conditions has no application to RE, neither will tests 8-10,
since their requirements of a physiologically normal observer properly
stationed in space & time are parts of the normal or proper conditions
requirement. And since these tests,
along with the agreement test, lack religious analogues, this greatly weakens
the analogical case for cognitivity."(p.308) If it is still argued that we have some
idea of the psychological & moral conditions that facilitate having a RE,
then Gale would reply that "Such causal knowledge as we have pertains to
the occurrence of a psychological occurrence or state- the having of an
of-God-type experience- & not to its veridicality."(p.308)
On test 6: "Since the apparent object of a RE ...
is not one object among others in a nomically determined system, the
continuity-./.-contents test cannot apply to it."(p.309)
On
test 7. For once, Gale thinks that a
test for RE is acceptable: the moral fruits test: "Since God is
essentially good, it is probable that those who have a veridical experience of
him will benefit morally & spiritually." (p.309) As for other predictions Gale is more
contemptuous. For example, Gutting
suggests that if a person has a veridical RE, he tends to have some more REs
later. To this Gale replies that:
"The atheist is far more in need of God's grace than is the person who is
already launched along the path of faith.
Thus, the atheist would seem more likely to have an of-God experience if
God exists than would the believer, especially since the atheist's disbelief
would help to offset the potentially freedom-canceling impact of the experience."(pp.310-1) Gale admits that these are not sincere
judgments. This retort just serves to
show "how little basis there is for making any probabilistic estimates at
all in this area. This radical
unpredictability stands in marked contrast with the familiar sort of
probabilistic predictions that are made within quantum & thermodynamic
theory, as well as of the free actions of persons" & he finds it a cognitively relevant
disanalogy.
Gale
then argues that counter-examples can be produced to Gutting's criteria which,
according to Gale, are:
"
(1) those who have had such experiences once would be likely to have
them again;
(2) other individuals will be found to have had similar experiences;
(3) those having such experiences will find themselves aided in their
endeavours to lead morally better lives." (p.311)
He
suggests that experience of orgasm passes analogues of Gutting's tests &
hence "Gutting's criteria for an objective or cognitive experience let in
too much"! He voices a similar
objection to Alston. According to Gale,
Alston proposes these criteria for a language game which is objective:
"(A)
The language game is played successfully in that the form of life it involves
has proven viable, (B) no assertion warranted by the rules of the game
contradicts anything that is warrantedly assertible within other language games
we play, & (C) the game is internally consistent because things happen by
& large in a manner that is explicable in terms of the categoreal nature of
the entities within the game's ontology."
Gale
again objects by saying that the language game of pain satisfies Alston's
criteria also! (p.312f.) "Thus, the
fact that the religious LG satisfies conditions (A)-(C) does not establish that
of-God experiences are objective."(p.313)
"One might try to block my counterexamples to the Gutting &
Alston criteria for the objectivity or cognitivity of a kind of experience by
restricting these criteria to kinds of experiences that are either putatively
perceptual or such that the apparent object of the experience would be
objective if real. The latter
restriction would be no help, since pains & other types of subjective
experiences have apparent objects that are real ... but not objective in the
sense of being mind-independent & a common object of the experiences of
different persons. Such restrictions,
furthermore, are viciously regressive, since people, especially philosophers,
often disagree about whether a certain type of experience is putatively
perceptual or such that its apparent object is objective if real at
all."(p.313) Gale realizes
that there are also philosophers who
think SE is not objective. So "What
is needed is a criterion for distinguishing ./. cognate & objective
accusatives so that these disputes can be settled. ... Surface grammar &
ordinary language are inadequate"(p.314)
On
test 11: caused-in-the right-way test. He notes SB's argument that if there is
a God, then every experience of God is veridical & replies: "God,
however, is essentially benevolent, & thereby would not cause an of-God
experience in a devious or ignoble way.
SB confounds the true proposition that it is impossible for God to cause
an of-God experience in the wrong way with the false proposition that it is
impossible for an of-God experience to be caused in the wrong way, that is, a
way that would preclude it having God as its cause."(pp.314-5) His examples are REs caused by ingesting LSD
or unconscious sexual desires. He thinks
it false that veridical REs can't have a sufficient natural cause because
"an event can be causally necessary for a given event though there intervenes
./. them a causally sufficient event.
... a veridical RE can have a sufficient natural cause, provided it is
consistent with the nature of the experience's apparent object to allow such a
cause."(p.315) However, the problem
is: "how it could be determined that a RE is caused in the right way by
its apparent object. ... Whereas we can determine on the basis of SE that a
given SE is caused in the right way by its apparent object, we cannot determine
on the basis of RE alone that a given RE is caused in the right way by its
apparent object. ... Why can't we have an argument based upon REs
for the existence of the apparent object of a given RE & its bearing the
right sort of causal relation to the experience? There can be such argument only if REs count
as cognitive. But they are cognitive only
if they are subject to similar tests to those that SEs are. And it has already been shown that this is
not the case."(p.316) (Italics mine)
As a summary, tests 6, 8-10 in SE have no RE analogues. Tests 5, 7 have at best quite weak
analogues. Test 11 is not
applicable.
Gale
further notes the problem of religious diversity. There is "no analogous diversity of
doxastic practices for basing claims about physical objects on SE that differ
among themselves as to what counts as confirmatory & disconfirmatory of a
given SE being veridical."
"This is a cognitively invidious disanalogy that should destroy the
requirement to extend the presumptive inference rule from the SE to the RE
doxastic practice in the name of the principle of parity . There should be parity in their treatment
only if they are sufficiently analogous."(p.317)
Gale
then turns to the responses of the defenders & criticizes them. SB admits that in RE we lack the knowledge of
the perceptual conditions & hence tests 8-10 are not applicable. However SB believes that only somewhat
lessens the evidential force of REs.
Gale complains that "The basis of SB's "somewhat lessens the
evidential force of" is obscure.
... The in-principle impossibility of disconfirming the veridicality of
a RE by appeal to the testimony of other observers ... calls into question the
very applicability of the agreement test to it.
... SB seems to have forgotten that he is supposed to be justifying the
extension of the PC to REs on the ground that they are sufficiently analogous
to SEs"(p.318)
Alston
has also noted a lot of disanalogies but he offers plausible explanation of
them. Gale's criticism is that "to
explain why the tests for sense & REs are not analogous is not to explain
away the disnanlogies; & these disanalogies are devastating to the
analogical argument."(p.319) It is
because Alston's demand for parity is
based on analogy. (p.321) He labels it
'Alston fallacy': "thinking that if he can give a categoreally
based explanation for a disanalogy ./. the religious- & SE doxastic
practices, it renders the disanalogy harmless."(p.322) So Gale's conclusion is that the analogical
arguers' treatment of the disanalogies is a failure.
Crucial Disanalogy
However, Gale thinks that he has yet to produce his
trump card. He argues that "A
veridical sense perception must have an object that is able to exist when not
actually perceived & be the common object of different sense
perceptions. For this to be possible,
the object must be housed in a space & time that includes both the object
& perceiver. ... there is no RE
analogue to this cpt of objective existence ... Because of this big disanalogy,
God is categoreally unsuited to serve as the object of a veridical perception,
whether sensory or nonsensory."(pp.326-7)
This view enables us to explain why in SE we have the above tests:
"Tests 5-11 are an organic unity of conceptually interrelated tests that
psp the same cpt of a veridical sense perception of an objective reality,
namely, that of a common space-time in which the subjects & objects of
veridical SEs causally interact in a mostly deterministic manner & that
permits those objects to exist when not actually perceived & be common
objects of different perceptions, as well as to be individuated by their
positions in space-time."(p.328)
The common worldview is that of "a common space-time receptacle in
which the objective accusatives of veridical SEs are the common causes of the
nomic-type coherence among the SEs of the differently positioned
perceivers." (p.328) He also thinks
that it is a necessary truth: "no two empirical individuals of the same
kind spatiotemporally coincide."(p.328)
He
then embarks on a lengthy criticism of Strawson who tries to argue for the
possibility of a sonic universe. His aim
is to argue that there is no alternative to the above cpt of an objective
empirical particular which is a suitable object of a veridical SE. (p.340)
In
this light he considers REs which have radically different grounds of
individuation:- by properties. This
grave disanalogy would "disqualify experiences of them as veridical perceptions
of objective particulars."
Furthermore "no analogous explanation can be given for how they can
exist unperceived & be common objects of different perceptions to that
which was previously given for empirical particulars."(p.341) It also provides no explanation why some fail
to perceive God or why there is just only one God as the object of REs. He concludes thus: "whereas the
worldview into which empirical particulars enter offers an explanation for the
organic unity of the sensory tests, there is no analogous view into which the
apparent object of REs enters that explains how the various RE analogues to
these tests ... are interconnected. ... They form a mere heap, with no rhyme or
reason why they should go together & serve to mutually reinforce each
other."(pp.342-3)
Gale's Misrepresentation of his Opponents
Gale's discussion is in general lively, clear &
incisive. He also throws light on the
organic unity of the tests of SE.
However, despite these merits, his case against the cognitivity of REs
or his rebuttal of the case for the cognitivity of REs is seriously
flawed. Some minor points frist. His understanding of LG fideism is
superficial. He regards it as a sort of
AA but LG fideism is typically argued for on more conceptual & abstract
grounds. His claim that the RE LG
belongs as a part to the physical world LG is also astonishing. The reverse perhaps is true. But his major fault is his serious
misunderstanding of the more sophisticated defenders of the argument from
REs. It is astounding that he says that
the only form of argument for the cognitivity of REs he knows is an analogical
argument (AA). I also believe it is not
right to attribute this AA to Alston, Gutting or SB[1].
The AA starts by assuming the unproblematical cognitivity of SE &
then bases the case on the analogy of RE with SE. However, as I have elaborated in chapter 10,
SB's argument from RE is better understood as a sort of transcendental argument
(TA). It starts by querying &
investigating how we can establish the cognitivity of any sort of experience,
including SE. It then proposes an a
priori epistemological principle like SB's PC or Alston's principle of
presumptive reliability of a viable epistemological practice. Since this principle is supposed to be a
priori, it is not based on any contingent features of SE or RE nor
on the analogy of RE with SE. This
interpretation is especially strained when he says SB is presenting the analogy
in the "manner of rearguard action"!
(For SB, I think, that they are all epistemic seemings is the only
crucial analogy.) It does not mean the TA cannot find further support from the
AA: the two arguments are not mutually exclusive because the defender of TA
usually also affirms the cognitivity of SE & some analogy of RE with
SE. Perhaps this partly accounts for
Gale's misunderstanding. If the above
interpretation is correct, then Gale's incisive criticisms seem to have hit
only a straw man.
Distinction Between the Analogical Argument
& the Transcendental Argument for Religious Experience
We have seen earlier the formulation of the AA. Let us formulate the Transcendental Argument
for RE (TA) as follows:
ii) Hence the PC should be applied to all
kinds of experience.
iii) Hence the PC should be applied to RE.
Actually
the two arguments are not mutually exclusive.
The analogical argument can be seen as a supporting argument to the
transcendental one. The considerations
of analogy can also help to dispel doubts about the transcendental
argument. But it is important to see
that the TA is not based on considerations of analogy & to refute
the TA, either (i) has to be denied or the inference from (i) to (ii) impugned[3]. So
it is not relevant to elaborate the disanalogies of RE with SE as a response to
the TA. Such considerations, if cogent,
can only refute the AA but not the TA.
It is surprising that many critics still cannot see this point. (It is shown, for example, by the response
paper of Daniels to Alston.)
Usually
people who dispute the application of the PC to REs would suggest that the PC is
only applicable when certain set of conditions C is satisfied. Then he claims that C obtains in the case of
SE but not in that of RE. So they argue
that though the PC can apply to SEs, it does not actually apply to REs. However we have to distinguish two claims:
(D) PC is applicable if C'
obtains. (C' as sufficient condition)
(E) PC is applicable only if C
obtains. (C as necessary condition)
To
support his argument, the critic has to claim (E) rather than (D). Suppose C includes universality, checkability
& so on. Grant that these are
sufficient conditions for PC being applicable.
Yet if they are not claimed as necessary conditions, there is no reason
why their lack shows that PC is not applicable.
Now "eating arsenic" is sufficient for death but a man can
still die of other causes, e.g. suffocation.
So the critic has to use (E) in his argument:
(E) PC is applicable only if C obtains.
(*) C does not obtain in the case of REs.
(F) So PC is not applicable to REs.
Now
the obvious trouble is how to establish (E) except by fiat or stipulative
definition. The critic has to rely on an
analogical argument[4] himself:
- C obtains for sensory experience when PC
is applicable to it.
- hence if PC is applicable to REs, C
obtains for REs.
- C does not obtain for REs. So PC is not applicable to REs.
This
argument on its own is exceedingly weak.
To carry conviction it has to be shown further that C is the reason why
PC is applicable to SE, i.e. were C not to obtain, PC would then not be
applicable to SE. It further implies
that to justify our belief that PC is applicable to SE we have to justifiedly
believe that C obtains for SE. To avoid
circularity, we cannot assume the
applicability of PC to SE when we attempt to justify the latter belief. This, I would argue, pose enormous
difficulties for the critics.
The
above argument seeks to find the necessary condition C for applicability of
PC. If this search is successful & C
shown not to obtain in RE, then the TA would be effectively rebutted. But the above discussion should convince us
that to achieve this is a tall order.
However there is another way to undercut the TA. We may ask why PC is applicable to sensory
experience & the following answer can be given:
(D) PC is applicable if C' obtains.
(#) C' obtains for sensory experience.
(G) So PC is applicable to sensory
experience.
The
idea is that we can justify the applicability of PC to SE by finding some
sufficient condition C'. Now notice that
it can't be argued that since C' does not obtain for RE, PC is inapplicable to
RE. It is because C' is only the
sufficient condition & not necessarily also the necessary condition for the
applicability of PC. So this argument
can't rebut the TA directly. However
this can refute (i) above by showing that applicability of PC need not be
presupposed; it can be inferred from C'.
But then we have to know or justifiedly believe that (D) &
(#). Again we cannot assume PC in
justifying (D) & (#). How it can be
done is not easily conceivable. For any
likely candidate for C', both (D) & (#) seem unknowable if we do not assume
PC. Actually the above argument may be
valid & sound but we can never use it to justify our trust in sensory
experience. If this line of argument is
correct, it gives some substance to the claim that the PC is fundamental. In another words, the PC seems to be an a
priori rather than a posteriori principle.
If so, there seems no reason why it shouldn't be applied to REs.
Again
the above argument is independent of considerations of analogy or disanalogy
which heavily beset the AA. So the
answer given by the PC to the Disanalogy Objection is more radical: the
disanalogy is not strictly relevant.
However the TA is not incompatible with AA. So the latter, if persuasive, can strengthen
the former. The discussion of this
section is rather abstract. Let's now
examine the analogical considerations & the above logical considerations
will be borne out in more concrete details.
The Logic of Comparison of Kinds of Experience
Disanalogy & Unreliability
Suppose it has been shown that REs & SEs are
greatly disanalogous. Does it show that
REs are then unreliable? It does not
seem to follow. This argument can only
go through if analogy[5] with SE is a necessary condition of
reliability of a kind of experience.
This premise is extremely dubious & I can see no way to establish it
at all. Perhaps the critic can press a
more modest objection: although the disanalogy does not show that RE is unreliable,
it does show that the presumption of its unreliability is justified. Again I can see no basis except
"epistemic chauvinism" for this line of reasoning. Consider a parallel argument against induction:
- Deduction is the only reliable
inferential method we know.
- Induction is disanalogous with deduction.
- Hence there is a presumption of
unreliability of induction.
How
good is this argument? The second
premise seems to be relatively secure.
Deduction is truth-preserving while induction is not. The former deals with the necessary
connection between propositions while the latter the "probabilistic"
connection between contingent truths.
Some also say that deduction is non-ampliative[6] while the latter ampliative. The differences are quite obvious. However there are problems. First of all the first premise begs the question
by assuming that we do no know that induction is reliable while we know that
deduction is reliable. This raises the question how deduction itself is to be
justified. Secondly why do we regard
analogy with deduction is essential for a kind of inference to be
reliable? Is it not implicitly assuming
that there is & can only be one kind of reliable inference? There does not seem to be any justification
for this assumption. Exactly because the
two methods are concerned with different kinds of epistemological connection,
isn't it to be expected that the two methods should also show differences
accordingly? The fact that induction is
disanalogous from deduction only shows that the two cannot be reliable in
the same way or to the same degree.
It is still a live possibility that induction can be as reliable as it
can be in the realm of contingent truths.
So this parallel argument against induction is not sound[7].
Similarly
the above argument against RE should also be rejected. Why should we expect that there is only one
kind of reliable experience? Isn't it
possible that our experience can have some access to different kinds of
contingent truths? If it is the case,
isn't it to be expected that there will be several kinds of experience
accordingly? Each may be reliable in its
own way & to different degrees. How
can we know a priori that it is not the situation we are in? It seems to me the contrary expectation
reflects the a priori nature of the presupposition of a narrow empiricism. It is laid down before hand that only SE can
be reliable & then it is used as the yardstick to measure all other
kinds of experience. Those who are
disanalogous with SE are then deemed unreliable. It should be clear that there is no obvious
reason that we should follow this procedure.
Perhaps
it can be denied that the assumption that only SE & its like are
reliable is an a priori one. It might be argued that this assumption is
justified by the facts of the matter. (Daniels, p.489) One SE can be confirmed by another & the
whole past record of SE is impeccable.
Hence it justifies the assumption that only SE is the reliable experience & the yardstick
of other kinds of experience. This
defense, however, won't do. This
justification of the reliability of SE is dependent upon the reliability of
memory. Otherwise how can we be sure
that the past record of SE is good? But
then memory is clearly disanalogous from SE in many respects. The realm of SE is that of the physical world
while that of memory is the past. SE is
mediated by sensations while images do not seem to be essential for memory
& so on. Hence if SE is the only yardstick,
memory does not seem to satisfy it. In itself this is hardly a consequence that
the "empiricist" will accept.
Not to mention that it undermines the earlier justification of SE.
The
appeal of narrow empiricism also derives from the success of science & is
reinforced by the resulting scientific worldview. It seems to show that SE is the only
foundation we can rely upon. But this is
not correct[8]: the actual success of science depends on
a lot of other epistemic capacities, e.g rational judgment, introspection[9].
These are all very disanalogous from SE.
So even on its own terms, a narrow empiricism can't sustain the idea
that disanalogy with SE is enough for discrediting a epistemic capacity. Our reply is quite general: it works with
whatever amount of disanalogy. This may
seem counterintuitive. Surely in cases
when a kind of experience is very disanalogous with SE, e.g. producing
massively inconsistent beliefs, we should discredit it? This may be true but the reason for
discreditation is not the disanalogy but the amount of contradictions.
In
general disanalogy with a well-established principle is not a sufficient reason
to discredit another principle unless there is reason to think that the known
principle & its like are the only possible principles. In the case of RE, it amounts to the
assumption that "we were entitled to assume that, if it is veridical, religious
cognition will be like other kinds of cognition which are veridical. Prima facie we should however expect it on
the contrary to be very different, since its object is so different."
(Ewing, p.115) This point has also been
amplified by Alston. He has delineated
clearly several assumptions which , if granted, render the disanalogy
intelligible:
"(A) God is too different from created
beings, too "wholly other", for us to be able to grasp any
regularities in His behaviour.
(B) for the same reason we can only attain
the faintest, sketchiest, & most insecure grasp of what God is like.
(C) God has decreed that a human being will
be aware of His presence in any clear & unmistakable fashion only when
certain special & difficult conditions are satisfied." (Alston 1983,
p.129) Alston thinks that these
assumptions seem to be central in many religions & they are in no way
incompatible with the substantial reliability of REs. Given them, we should positively expect REs
to be different from sensory experiences.
We do not need to fully agree with Alston's theological explanation of
the disanalogy. It just serves to
illustrate the fact that the disanalogy of RE with SE as such is not an
adequate reason for asserting the unreliability of RE.
Analogy & Reliability
On the other hand some argue from the analogy with SE
to prima facie reliability. The argument
can be formulated in this way:
A) SEs are prima facie reliable.
B) REs are sufficiently analogous with SEs.
C) Hence REs are also prima facie reliable.
I'll
call this "the Analogical Argument for RE" (hereafter abbreviated
AA). It has several
characteristics. Firstly, It takes the
reliability of SE as the unproblematic starting point. Secondly, the form of the argument is
analogical & hence not deductively tight.
This, however, does not matter.
In many cases a good argument from analogy is as good as anything we can
hope for. To reject the AA just because
it is an argument from analogy is clearly unjustifiable. It is especially so when we have no foolproof
argument to establish premise (A) in the first place[10]. In
that case our confidence in the reliability of SE is necessarily tied to some
characteristics of SE which we regard as marks of reliability, e.g.
universality, testability. If REs share
all of these marks, I can see no way to resist the AA. Similarly, the argument can be very persuasive if the analogy is strong.
So
the crucial premise is (B) which is unfortunately quite vague. The proponent of the AA never says that REs
are wholly analogous with SEs. To
say this is to invite immediate defeat.
So the analogy is only argued to be "sufficient" or "in
the relevant aspects". "What
are the relevant aspects" is a controversial question & the debates
revolve around this issue. The critics
say that the analogy is weak, insufficient, & not obtaining in the relevant
aspects. The defenders contrarily argue
that the analogy, though incomplete, is significant, sufficient, &
obtaining in the relevant aspects. How
are we going to resolve this dispute?
There seems to be no other way than by patiently looking at the various
features of analogy & disanalogy,
& by evaluating the relevance or irrelevance of these features. This we try to do later.
Another
point should be noted here. The
proponent of the AA contends that a sufficient analogy of RE with SE is a
strong reason to suppose that RE is also PF reliable. This contention, however, does not commit him
to the claim that the lack of a sufficient analogy of RE with SE is a good
reason for thinking RE unreliable.
Consider a parallel: the claim that a sufficient dosage of arsenic would
cause your death does not entail that if you do not take arsenic, then you will
not die. This deduction is clearly
fallacious because there is a million ways to cause death. Similarly, although the proponent of the AA
assumes that SE can be unproblematically taken to be a reliable source
of beliefs, there is no reason why he cannot also think that there are several
different reliable sources which are very different from one another. Gale seems to think that if one adopts the
AA, then one is also committed to the logic of the Disanalogy Objection. I think it is just a confusion.
Analogy & Unreliability
There can be another kind of argument: by pointing out
the analogy of RE with some kinds of discredited experiences (widely regarded
as unreliable) the critic may try to show the unreliability of RE. For example it can be pointed out that REs
are as a rule as "subjective" as aesthetic experiences are. Then it may be argued that since the latter
is cognitively unreliable (in the sense that they do not tell us any objective
features of the world) the former probably also is. As a response, it might be argued that the
experience alleged to be discredited is not really so. Otherwise, the evaluation process seems to be
similar to the above. The points of
analogy or disanalogy have to be examined in details & then evaluated as to
their relevance.
Analogy & Rebuttal of charge of
unreliability
Sometimes the critics use various arguments to support
the claim that REs are unreliable (which are not arguments in terms of analogy). These arguments can be rebutted if analogous
arguments can be constructed to discredit SEs.
Namely the features that are supposed to discredit REs are also present
in SEs in an analogous way. For example
the deductive gap objection can be rebutted in this way. In the past philosophers make heavy water out
of this gap & it is extraordinary that the same gap in SEs is not mentioned
at all. It is no use to reply that SEs
can be shown to be reliable by other means.
This only strengthens the impression that that gap is far from
fatal. If REs are still suspected this
is not because of the logical gap, but because of the lack of other confirming
features or alleged marks of reliability.
So considerations of analogy can still be used for a negative defense of
RE even though such considerations are not strong enough to mount a positive
case for RE.
Marks of Reliability
The analogy argument seems to be operated with the assumption that some
marks of reliability can be identified, e.g. universality, intersubjectivity,
"testability", etc. But
actually how do we justify this assumption?
It is not possible to establish this by deduction. It just seems obvious that, say, universality
is no guarantee of truth & reliability.
It seems logically possible that a great number of men can be massively
& systematically deceived by an evil genius (natural or supernatural). Is it possible to establish this by induction
then? The prospect is also very
dim. One way to do that is by
enumerative induction: to inspect many kinds of reliable experience
& to see whether universality is almost always present as a mark. If so presumably universality can be regarded
as a mark of reliability & its presence allows us to argue for the
reliability of a certain kind of experience.
However it is clear that such process is hardly practicable unless there
is an a priori way to determine the reliability of a given kind of experience. This assumption is unlikely to be granted by
critics of REs. Perhaps there are other
principles of induction, e.g. principle of simplicity, inference to the best
explanation, which can be appealed to here.
Of course the problem here is the justification of these principles
themselves. We may argue that these
principles are just intuitively correct.
Alternatively we may justify these principles with our best judgments
of what are the good inductive arguments.
The former a priori road is not likely to be adopted by the critics of
RE since most of them are sort of empiricists.
The latter road obviously presupposes a lot of empirical knowledge. The whole thing again turns into a circle
then.
How
can any mark of reliable experience be established by experiences then? It seems to be the case that many critics are
prepared to assert the reliability of SEs & then use this to support the
claim that universality is a mark of reliability. But then when it is asked that why we regard
SEs as reliable, universality is often cited as a reason. This is painfully circular but sometimes
circular arguments work if supported by unshakable confidence. Then the circularity is declared to be
"virtuous & not vicious".
The grounds for this is just opaque to me.
Here
I am not saying this confidence should be undermined. Far from it.
The credulity approach exactly acknowledges the necessity of this trust
& argues that this element of trust should not be masked by spurious
arguments & rhetoric. Then the
natural question is "If this trust is so fundamental, i.e. this is prior
to identification of any mark of reliability, why the opposite attitude should
be adopted in other cases?" This is
the deeper question which the defender of PC wants to ask. Hence the PC should be distinguished from the
analogical approach to experiences. It
may be called the transcendental approach.
Let's explore the difference further
Evaluation of Gale's Criticisms
Gale is further confounded by his failure to
distinguish the two questions of veridicality:
1) The radical question: what is the case
for the cognitivity of a kind of experience as a whole, i.e., that it yields
knowledge of reality roughly as that kind of experience indicates?
2) The less radical question: assuming that
a kind of experience is in general cognitive, what are the criteria to
distinguish the token experiences which are veridical from those which are not?
Let
us consider how are we to answer the first question. If there is another kind of experience whose
reliability or cognitivity we can assume, perhaps the case can be made by using
the latter to vindicate the former.
Suppose there is a kind of telepathic experience. To ascertain whether it is reliable, we can
use SE to check its outputs if we can assume that SE is reliable. However, if a general question is raised as
to why we think any kind of experience, including SE, is reliable, the above
procedure is of no help. In general, it
is easy to see that empirical considerations cannot be adduced for the case
since it clearly begs the question against the sceptic. Especially in this context, it can be seen
that it is no answer to question 1 by pointing out that we have tests to
distinguish the veridical from the illusory experiences such as Gale's
tests. Several tests are just negative
tests, e.g. consistency test. The others
all seem to presuppose the reliability of some SEs. How else can we determine what are the normal
conditions for reliable SEs & how else can we ascertain whether they
obtain in certain situations? Even if we
adopt the organic view of the tests espoused by Gale, the problem is far from
being solved. That view points out that
the tests are as we should expect if the ontology of SE is correct. It is not clear this fact in what sense helps
to discredit the sceptical alternatives.
Presumably the evil scientist who manipulates our brains do not just
generate the perceptions at random.
Perhaps all perceptions are generated as if the ontology of SE were true & hence it is
also to be expected that the apparent perceptions of the brains-in-vats conform
to Gale's test.
So
it seems that Gale is not aware that SB & Alston are pressing question 1
rather than question 2. Both in the end
admit that no empirical argument can be given as a convincing answer. They posit the PC or the presumptive
inference rule as an a priori or transcendental principle. The adoption of this rule is not dependent on
the sort of tests available in SE or the sensory practice (Alston). So their arguments are not arguments from analogy. Gale misunderstands completely their
positions. Perhaps they also appeal to
analogical considerations. These,
however, are not the foundation of their arguments. The analogy is only used to reinforce the
conclusion & to forestall some objections.
It is not incompatible with the transcendental argument because the
analogical argument only needs to assert that the analogy with SE is a
sufficient condition for cognitivity. It
doesn't need to say that the analogy with SE is a necessary condition for
cognitivity. Certainly Gale holds to the
latter: for him, REs "are cognitive only if they are subject to
similar tests to those that SEs are."(p.316). Actually he uses this to argue for the
non-cognitivity of RE:
A1) A kind
of experience is cognitive only if it is analogous with SE, especially
in the matter of having analogous tests.
A2) RE is
not analogous with SE.
A3) Hence RE
is not cognitive.
It is a pity that he never gives any reason for
(A1). He does not even make it explicit
& unquestioningly relies on it as an undisputed premise. Perhaps he thinks that the analogical arguers
should also commit to (A2) & therefore treats as a shared premise ./. Gale
& his opponents. This is a mistake.
They need subscribe to this only:
A4) If
a kind of experience is analogous with SE, then it is cognitive.
It would be a poor mistake to confuse (A1)
with (A4). I think that Alston & SB
would both reject Gale's assumption: "If REs are cognitive, they would be
subject to similar tests to those SEs are." They rightly point out that if any RE is
veridical & there is a being like God, the above assumption is probably
false. So to assert (A1) without
argument is to beg the question against SB & the like. I wonder what reasons are there for believing
in this premise? Despite disclaimers to
be a chauvinist, he turns out to be one after all!
Similar
confusions lie behind his strictures of Gutting's & Alston's criteria. First of all, I think from the context it is
clear that Gutting & Alston are confining their discussions to intentional
or outer-directed experiences. The
examples of pain or orgasm are totally irrelevant. Gale is aware of this reply but his reasons
for rejecting this reply is only this: "people, especially philosophers,
often disagree about whether a certain type of experience is putatively
perceptual or such that its apparent object is objective if real at
all."(p.313) Is Gale really serious
that there are genuine significant disagreements over the question: "If
pain or orgasm is real, are they then objective?" I think sufficient attention to the phenomenology
would generate an unambiguous 'no'. I
also deny that philosophers' disagreement should take primacy over the ordinary
people's awareness of the nature of their experiences. Secondly, these criteria are supposed to be
internal criteria, i.e. they are answers to the question: "assuming a kind
of experience or epistemic practice is generally reliable, how to distinguish
the veridical ones from the unveridical?"
They are not supposed to be answers to the more radical question. In fact Alston explicitly says that the
reliability of any LG can't be established in the strong sense! Hence Alston can't be claiming that if a LG
satisfies his criteria, then it entails the reliability of that LG. Similarly, it is not clear that experiences
which satisfy tests 1-11 would thereby be proved to be veridical. If it is true, Gale's stricture of Gutting or
Alston's criteria of experience is not fair.
He interprets them as logically tight conditions for cognitivity but it
is hardly what Gutting or Alston would mean by them. Hence his 'counterexamples' of pain &
orgasm are really ridiculous!
The
merit of Gale's discussion is that he does press his fingers on some
disanalogies. Perhaps it is the grounds
for the strong 'intuition' among the critics that SE is relaible while the
others are not. However, if we
disentangle the above two questions, it seems that such disanalogies are not
relevant to question 1 unless one can find a test which is non-circular &
assumption-free. The disanalogies are
indeed relevant to question 2. The
availability of such tests show that if we assume the general reliability of
SE, we are then able to distinguish the veridical SEs from the illusory one
by relatively clear criteria. It is not
the same in the case of RE. It does make
us more sceptical of the individual REs.
This does not imply we should then think that RE as a whole is
unreliable or completely illusory! (A
kind of experience can be highly unreliable without being completely
illusory. It is all too easy to confuse
the two. The latter claim is astounding:
that all through the ages all religious people on the earth are utterly
deceived or deluded. If only one of them
is not deluded, RE is not completely illusory even though it were highly
unreliable.) Reliability is a matter of
degree & all of Gale's discussions is to show that SE is more reliable than
RE. SE also exhibits a much higher
degree of intra-coherence & worldview coherence than RE. But this is a far cry from saying that REs
are then unreliable simpliciter.
Furthermore, part of the problem is generated by taking all REs into a
group. The problem would be alleviated
if we confine to some sub-type of RE, e.g. TE.
Gale's
discussion of the 'crucial' disanalogy again displays his epistemic
chauvinism. Suppose he is correct about
the necessary conditions for a veridical sense perception. It is only one concept of an objective
empirical particular. To argue that it
is the only viable concept would have presupposed that physical object is the
only possible kind of objective existent & that SE is the only viable kind
of experience. It is just arguing in a
circle. Gale also claims that his
framework can explain why objects can exist unperceived & the like. I wonder what sort of explanation has
been provided here. What is space-time
& how it can house the object?
Myriad more questions can be asked & I wonder whether the cpt of
'objective existence' is more fundamental to 'spatio-temporal existence'.
Gale also thinks that his argument would
commit him to reject intellectual & moral intuition & the like as
non-cognitive. I wonder whether this
shouldn't be taken as a reason to reject his argument. It is surprising that he also appeals to
necessary truth & conceptual truth: "no two empirical individuals of
the same kind spatiotemporally coincide." (p.328). I would like to see how he is going to
justify the above claim apart from any appeal to intuitions. He has not even hinted at the answer.
I
also thinks he exaggerates the disanalogy & underrate the analogy between
SE & RE. The detailed arguments for
this claim has been given in chapter 10.
Only some brief points here.
Concerning test 5, Gale asserts that "The agreement or disagreement
of other observers is relevant only if their observations are made under
so-called normal or standard conditions."
This is incorrect. Agreement
can't be wholly dependent on concept of 'normal observer' because I can't see
how we can ascertain the latter apart from some agreement. Besides we also cherish the agreement in
logical intuitions & rational judgment.
The notion of 'normal observer' is also not applicable in these
cases. So we can't dismiss the reports
of similar experiences as a sort of important agreement. On tests 8-10: Gale thinks that if it is
still argued that we have some idea of the psychological & moral
conditions that facilitate having a RE, then he would reply that "Such
causal knowledge as we have pertains to the occurrence of a psychological
occurrence or state- the having of an of-God-type experience- & not to its
veridicality."(p.308) This claim is
deeply misleading as if we can have direct test of the presence of a
physical object apart from any experience.
If it were the case, the sceptical questions can be easily
dismissed. It is also surprising to find
Gale claiming that "whereas the worldview into which empirical particulars
enter offers an explanation for the organic unity of the sensory tests, there
is no analogous view into which the apparent object of REs enters that explains
how the various RE analogues to these tests ... are interconnected. ... They
form a mere heap, with no rhyme or reason why they should go together &
serve to mutually reinforce each other."(pp.342-3) He himself admits of the plausibility of
Alston's explanation of the disanalogies in terms of the categoreal nature of
God. Isn't it a sort of coherence &
explanation? I have also argued in
chapters 8 & 10 that many coherence tests are available for TEs which are
as we should expect from the nature of the apparent object of this kind of
experience. Isn't it also a coherent
relationship ./. the tests & the ontology in cases of TE?
In
general Gale suffers from a preoccupation with SE & he ignores the
possibility of a plurality of basic cognitive[11] experiences. So Gale's criteria of a cognitive experience
seem too strong. Consider again memory,
introspection & rational intuition.
In a recent book, Audi argues that they are all basic sources of
justification & in this sense cognitive experiences. However, probably Gale's criteria will rule
them all out! Firstly, they are not of
any objective empirical particular in space-time. Secondly, how can we show, say, by memory
alone that the memory experience is caused by the past event? Even if Gale is prepared to uphold his
criteria & to reject all these experiences, there is no reason why we
should follow him. I conclude that
Gale's case vs REs has not been made.
Coherence of the Tests of Theistic Experience
We need to analyze the concept of 'reality'. An experience is veridical if it is in
contact with reality. But what are the implications
of this? It depends on the kind of
reality we are supposed to be in contact.
This is the basic principle. The
epistemic implications of a cognitive experience is in accordance with the
categoreal nature of the object confronted in experience. No a priori restriction is possible. Of course, if we conceive of reality as very
transient & isolated from other kinds of reality, though I would not say it
is incoherent, I do think this type of experience is epistemically
inferior. cf. AE Taylor's elucidation of
reality in terms of experience. But there
are several dimensions of a 'knowable' reality:
1) It persists in existence => chance of
further experiences.
2) It exists independently => sense of
reality.
3) It has properties which are not exhausted
by a finite stream of experiences => it sustains a process of discovery
& reciprocity (questioning & modification).
4) It has causal power => it has effects
on our lives. (Not applicable to abstract objects even if they are real: but
they can affect us through our grasp of them.
cf. Popper's world 3)
5) It has a coherent description: reality
cannot be self-contradictory => experiences of the same object have to be
coherent as well.
6) It is part of the Reality & Reality
can't be self-contradictory (pace Stace) => so experiences of one reality
should cohere with experience of another reality or well-established
inferential knowledge of other realities.
(This comports with theistic assumptions. See Holmes, Contours for a Worldview,
p.51f., All Truth is God's Truth, Ch.7.
It is questionable whether the nontheist can justify the adoption of
coherentist criteria: why the world must be coherent/ intelligible? Search for coherence is clearly a human
imperative.) Also see "An
Epistemological Argument" in Craig & McLeod.
7) It has some determinate characteristics
=> more determinate effects. E.g.
physical object => sensations.
Persons => union of will with will is the highest confirmation of the
experience => also highest & fullest kind of knowledge.
Personal
encounter with God => aiming at union of human will with Divine will
(Farrer) => moral progress, self-discovery.
(More detailed models needed.
Circularity? Yes, but
unavoidable.) God as Creator:
providential experience, miracles. God
as ground of community => God among us. etc.
So the tests of TE are clearly relevant & well-motivated. See SB's account in Revelation.
Family Resemblance Argument
Now I want to elaborate a point I have made
above. This is the point that the usual
procedure of weighing RE against SE is very dubious because the implicit
assumption is that SE is the only yardstick.
Now I have argued in earlier chapters that SE can not be the only basic
source of justification. This claim
would only land us in scepticism. To
rise above the sceptical bog, memory must be regarded as another basic
source. Furthermore, I think that
introspection & rational intuition are also indispensable basic sources.
Now if this is granted, the whole picture of drawing analogy between different
types of experience would be radically different from that of the narrow
empiricist, whether the PCT is granted or not.
Suppose we can identify the prominent epistemological characteristics of
SE as a type as c1,
c2, ...
cn. If SE is regarded as the sole yardstick, then
insofar as RE lacks some of them, we are tempted to say that RE is discredited
to some extent. This temptation, as I
have argued earlier, is by no means irresistible if we can provide a reasonable
explanation of this lack. However, we
may still remain a bit dissatisfied. The
situation would be changed if we keep in mind that our basic sources are more
numerous & they are also very different from one another. I have argued that the best way of justifying
RE should not be by way of analogy at
all: it should be by the appeal to the PCT as a fundamental principle. However for the sake of argument let us
suppose that this way is out & ultimately we have to rely on analogy. How should we proceed then? We should first of all decide what are the
basic sources of justification & I suggest that we should include at least
SE, memory, introspection & reason among them. Then we should identify, with regard to each,
the set of epistemological characteristics which characterizes the source. Now suppose a new source of beliefs is
alleged to be another basic source of justification & we want to evaluate
this claim. If we proceed to do this by
way of analogy, we should compare this source with all the four basic
sources. The analysis is admittedly more
complicated but in this way the more simplistic errors can be avoided. Suppose there is a ci which characterizes SE but not RE. This might look to be disconfirming RE
earlier on but if ci is also not exemplified
by the other basic source(s), then this conclusion shouldn't be drawn. In this way, many of the alleged crucial
disanalogies can be rendered harmless, e.g. unavailability of checking
procedure, poverty of details, lack of mutual confirmation of several sensory
modalities, & impossibility of empirical study of the faculty of
perception.
The
other point is that we can identify the really crucial mark of a source of
justification with more confidence. If
we want to find out the genuine characteristics of a human being, this is
scarcely possible if the only samples available are adult males. If we select a sample of different sexes,
ages & races, the results would be less prone to be errors. Now this is also the case with the process of
deciding what are the marks of a basic source of justification: we should
decide what are the characteristics which are shared by all the basic sources
we can start with. The answers seem to
be that they are all cases of epistemic seeming & that the source of beliefs
possesses some sort of intra-coherence & inter-coherence. In this way these marks can be seen to be
much more important than before.
In
case that some characteristics are present in most but not all the basic
sources we start with, then we can still use the notion of family resemblance
to evaluate an alleged new source of basic justification. We treat the original sources as members of a
family. Perhaps there is no one
characteristic which is shared by all of them. Nonetheless they may show family resemblance
with one another. (cf. Wittgenstein) So if a new source is evaluated, it should be
checked with respect to its family resemblance with the whole family. Hence a multi-dimensional testing is needed. To carry this out, we need more detailed
comparisons of RE with SE, memory, introspection, & reason. If the result is favorable to RE, then the
above argument can be called a family resemblance argument for RE. I think it is much better than the AA & its
chance of being successful is higher.
Conclusion
Gale’s criticisms of the argument from RE are not
convincing. For other criticisms of Gale, see Plantinga’s Warranted
Christian Belief (Plantinga 2000, 335-342).
